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Abstract: The Internet has evolved into a ubiquitous digital environment in which people 
communicate, seek information, and make decisions. Online environments are replete with 
smart, highly adaptive choice architectures designed primarily to maximize commercial 
interests, capture and sustain users’ attention, monetize user data, and predict and influence 
future behavior. This online landscape holds multiple negative consequences for society, such 
as a decline in human autonomy, rising incivility in online conversation, the facilitation of 
political extremism, and the spread of disinformation. Benevolent choice architects working 
with regulators may curb the worst excesses of manipulative choice architectures, yet the 
strategic advantages, resources, and data remain with commercial players. One way to 
address this imbalance is with interventions that empower Internet users to gain some control 
over their digital environments, in part by boosting their information literacy and their 
cognitive resistance to manipulation. Our goal is to present a conceptual map of interventions 
that are based on insights from psychological science. We begin by systematically outlining 
how online and offline environments differ despite being increasingly inextricable. We then 
identify four major types of challenges that users encounter in online environments: 
persuasive and manipulative choice architectures, AI-assisted information architectures, 
distractive environments, and false and misleading information. Next, we turn to how 
psychological science can inform interventions to counteract these challenges of the digital 
world. After distinguishing between three types of behavioral and cognitive interventions—
nudges, technocognition, and boosts—we focus in on boosts, of which we identify two main 
groups: (1) those aimed at enhancing people’s agency in their digital environments (e.g., self-
nudging, deliberate ignorance) and (2) those aimed at boosting competences of reasoning and 
resilience to manipulation (e.g., simple decision aids, inoculation). These cognitive tools are 
designed to foster the civility of online discourse and protect reason and human autonomy 




against manipulative choice architectures, attention-grabbing techniques, and the spread of 
false information. 
Key words: algorithms, artificial intelligence, attention economy, decision autonomy, 
behavioral policy, boosting, choice architecture, cognitive tools, decision aids, digitalization, 
disinformation, false news, Internet, nudging, online environments, online manipulation, 
online reasoning, self-nudging, technocognition. 
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1. The Role and Responsibility of Psychological Science in the Digital Age 
In 1969, the year Neil Armstrong became the first person to walk on the moon, the Internet—
then known as ARPANET—was brought online. The first host-to-host message was sent 
from a computer at UCLA to a computer at Stanford University and it read “lo.” The network 
crashed before the full message, “login,” could be transmitted. Fast forward half a century 
from this first step into cyberspace, and the Internet has evolved into a ubiquitous global 
digital environment, populated by more than 4 billion people
1
 and entrenched in nearly all 
aspects of their professional, public, and private lives. 
The evolution of digital technologies has given rise to possibilities that were largely 
inconceivable in 1969, such as instant worldwide communication, a mostly unfettered and 
constant access to information, democratized production and dissemination of information 
and digital content, and the ability to coordinate global political movements. But as the 
popular adage goes, there is no such thing as a free lunch. Digital technology has also 
introduced challenges that imperil the well-being of individuals and the functioning of 
democratic societies, such as the rapid spread of false information and online manipulation of 
public opinion (e.g., Bradshaw & Howard, 2019; Kelly, Truong, Shahbaz, Earp, & White, 
2017), as well as new forms of social malpractice such as cyberbullying (Kowalski, Giumetti, 
Schroeder, & Lattanner, 2014) and online incivility (Anderson, Brossard, Scheufele, Xenos, 
& Ladwig, 2014). Moreover, the Internet is no longer an unconstrained and independent 
cyberspace but, notwithstanding appearances, a highly controlled environment. Online, 
whether people are accessing information through search engines or social media, their 
access is regulated by algorithms and design choices made by corporations in pursuit of 
profits and with little transparency or public oversight. Government control over the Internet 
                                                 
1
 See International Telecommunication Union (2018) and We Are Social, DataReportal, & Hootsuite (2019). 




is largely limited to authoritarian regimes (e.g., China, Russia); in democratic countries, 
technology companies have accumulated unprecedented resources, market advantages, and 
control over people’s data and access to information (Zuboff, 2019). 
This hidden commercial regulation has been brought into sharp focus by several 
scandals implicating the social media giant Facebook in unethical dealings with people’s data 
(Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018). Regulators and the general public have awakened to 
the extent to which digital technologies and tech companies can infringe on people’s privacy 
and control access to information; these scandals revealed the manipulative power of 
techniques such as “dark ads” (advertising messages that are visible only to those who are 
targeted by them) and microtargeting (customizing advertisements to particular individuals), 
which influence people’s decision making and voting behavior by exploiting their 
psychological vulnerabilities and personal identities (e.g., Matz, Kosinski, Nave, & Stillwell, 
2017). There is no panacea for solving these problems. Instead, there are multiple entry 
points for addressing the existing and emerging challenges (Figure 1; see also Lazer et al., 
2018). We argue that psychology must play a key role in this process. 
 
 
Figure 1. Entry points for policy interventions in the digital world. 




The first entry point for interventions comes from the realm of law and ethics; this 
includes legislative regulations and ethical guidelines (e.g., Ethics guidelines for trustworthy 
AI by the High Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 2019). Regulatory 
interventions can, for instance, introduce transparent rules for data protection (e.g., the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR) or for political campaigning 
on social media, and impose significant costs for violating them; it can also implement 
serious incentives (and disincentives) for tech firms and the media to ensure that shared 
information is reliable and online conversation is civil. Regulatory initiatives should strive to 
create a coherent user-protection framework instead of the fragmentary legislative landscape 
currently in place (e.g., see Jaursch, 2019 for Germany and the EU).
2
 The second entry point 
for interventions is technological: Structural solutions are introduced into online architectures 
in order to mitigate adverse social consequences. For example, social media platforms can 
take technological measures to remove fake and automated accounts, ensure transparency in 
political advertisement, and detect and limit the spread of fake news using automated or 
outsourced fact checking (e.g., Harbath & Chakrabarti, 2019; Rosen, Harbath, & Gleicher, 
2019). However, such measures are mainly self-regulatory, depend heavily on the company’s 
good will, and are often only introduced following considerable public, political, and 
regulatory pressure.  
The third entry point for interventions is educational. These interventions are directed 
at the public as recipients and producers of information—for example, school curricula for 
digital information literacy that teaches students how to search, filter, evaluate, and manage 
                                                 
2
 The present regulatory framework is fragmented and disparate and focuses on the types of actors online instead 
of providing a more coherent form of protection that covers the entirety of the online experience (Leiser, 2019). 
Moreover, the EU and the US are likely to pursue different regulatory approaches to specific problems since the 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution will take precedent over many other goals (e.g., privacy). 




data, information, and digital content (e.g., Breakstone, McGrew, Smith, Ortega, & 
Wineburg, 2018; McGrew, Smith, Breakstone, Ortega, & Wineburg, 2019). Finally, the 
fourth entry point for interventions comes from psychological science and encompasses 
behavioral and cognitive interventions: Here, nonregulatory, nonmonetary policy measures 
are implemented to empower people and steer their decision making towards greater 
individual and public good. In online behavioral and cognitive policy making, there are three 
notable approaches to designing interventions. The first is nudging, which aims to guide 
people’s behavior through the design of choice architectures (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The 
second is boosting, which seeks to improve people’s cognitive and motivational competences 
(Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, 2017). The third is technocognition, which aims to design 
technological solutions resting on and informed by psychological principles identified in the 
study of human cognition (Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017). 
The four entry points for interventions—coming from law, technology, education, and 
psychology—are interrelated and can inform each other. For example, regulations on the 
ethical design of digital technologies should inform technological, educational, and 
behavioral interventions. At the same time, behavioral and cognitive insights from 
psychological science can be useful for designing both educational and technological tools. In 
this article we are concerned specifically with behavioral and cognitive interventions that can 
be successfully applied to counter the challenges people encounter in digital environments. 
Indeed, our main aim is to present a conceptual map of a single type of cognitive intervention 
in the digital world: boosts. We focus on boosts for several reasons. First, although the call to 
increase people’s ability to deal with the challenges of online environments is growing louder 
(e.g., Independent High Level Group of Fake News and Online Disinformation, 2018; Lazer 
et al., 2018), there has been no systematic account of interventions based on insights from 
psychological science that could form the foundation of future efforts. Second, the Internet is 




a barely constrained playground for commercial policy makers and choice architects acting in 
accordance with financial interests; in terms of power and resources, benevolent public 
choice architects are at a significant disadvantage. It is therefore crucial to ensure that 
psychological and behavioral sciences are employed not to manipulate users for financial 
gain, but instead to empower the public to detect and resist manipulation. Finally, boosts are 
the least paternalistic measures in the toolbox of public policy makers and potentially the 
most resilient in the face of rapid technological change as they aim to foster lasting and 
generalizable competences in users. 
We begin by comparing online environments with offline environments in order to fill 
any gaps in the current understanding of new digital environments (Section 2). In Section 3, 
we consider the challenges people encounter in the digital world and show how they impact 
users’ cognitive and motivational abilities. We distinguish four types of challenges: 
persuasive and manipulative choice architectures (Section 3.1), AI-assisted information 
architectures (Section 3.2), distractive environments (Section 3.3), and false and misleading 
information (Section 3.4). We then turn to the question of how to counteract these challenges. 
After a brief review of the types of behavioral and cognitive interventions that can be applied 
to the digital world (nudges, technocognition, and boosts; Section 4) we focus on boosts 
(Section 5). Here we identify four types of boosts: self-nudging, which aims at enhancing 
people’s agency in their digital environments (Section 5.1); deliberate ignorance, which can 
be used as a tool for information management (Section 5.2); simple decision aids, which can 
help people accurately assess content they encounter online (Section 5.3); and inoculation, 
which is a preemptive intervention that aims to boost people’s resilience to online 
misinformation and manipulation (Section 5.4). These tools are designed to foster the civility 
of online discourse and protect reason and human autonomy against manipulative choice 
architectures, attention-grabbing techniques, and the spread of false information. 





Glossary of Technical Terms 
Term Definition 
Algorithms  In the context of digital environments, computer programs that order, 
classify, generalize, predict, and filter information online. Algorithms 
can be rule-based (i.e., instructions are programmed by humans) or self-
learning programs (“machine learning”). 
Artificial intelligence (AI) In the context of digital environments, mainly refers to self-learning 
computer programs (“machine learning”) that analyze people’s personal 
data and digital footprints in order to customize their online experience. 
Also includes fields such as robotics, knowledge representation and 
reasoning, planning, and computer vision.  
AI‐assisted information architectures AI-powered algorithmic tools that filter and mediate information online 
(e.g., targeted advertising, personalized recommender systems, 
algorithmic filtering in search engines, personalized curation of news 
feeds on social media; see Figure 3 for an overview).  
Recommender (also: 
Recommendation) systems 
Information-filtering and associations-finding algorithms that suggest 
products based on users’ past activities and preferences as well as the 
activities and preferences of other users with similar tastes. 
Personalized or targeted advertising A type of online advertising that shows ads to people based on their 
online activity as well as both stated and inferred characteristics (e.g., 
gender, age, interests, political views, personality traits). 
Data privacy Online, a set of rules for how Internet companies collect, share, and use 
personal information. An important aspect of data privacy concerns the 
choice of users to reveal or protect their personal information. 
Dark patterns Designs of user interfaces employed to steer people’s choices towards 
unintended decisions in the service of commercial interests. 
Choice architecture Design of the external environments within which people make 
decisions (e.g., location of subway exits, presentation of foods in a 
cafeteria, display of search results for local restaurants on Google Maps, 
privacy settings on Facebook). Strategically organizing the external 
context in which people make decisions is one way to affect their 
choices. 
Internet A global system of interconnected computer networks that includes 
several applications—e.g., the web, e-mail, messenger systems, and 
mobile applications—for communication between devices and for 
access to the information contained within these networks.  
Web (a.k.a. World Wide Web or www) A standardized system for accessing and navigating information on the 
Internet; it requires web browsers for access. 
Social web Web-based social networks and other collaborative platforms (e.g., 
forums). Advanced social web: Global social media websites (e.g., 
Facebook, Twitter). 
 
2. Systematic Differences Between Online and Offline Environments 
The Internet and the devices people use to access it represent not just new technological 
achievements, but also entirely new artificial environments. Much like people’s physical 
surroundings, these are environments in which people spend time, communicate with each 




other, search for information, and make decisions. Yet the digital world is a recent 
phenomenon: The Internet is 50, the web is 30, and the advanced social web is merely 15 
years old (see Table 1 for definitions). New adjustments and features are added to these 
environments on a continuous basis, making it nearly impossible for most users, let alone 
regulators, to keep abreast of the inner workings of their digital surroundings. 
Online reality tends to be seen as different from the physical world, and computer-
mediated social activities are often described as inferior substitutes for real-life or face-to-
face interactions (for an overview see Green & Clark, 2015). However, this presumed 
dualism between online and offline worlds is becoming more problematic—and possibly 
obsolete—as the line separating the two environments continue to blur. The ubiquitous nature 
of computing
3
 and the integration of digital devices and services into material objects (e.g., 
cars) and actions in the physical world (e.g., navigation) makes it difficult to delineate when 
one is truly online or offline—a phenomenon that Floridi (2014) called the “onlife 
experience” (p. 43). This effect is highly visible in computerized work environments, where 
more and more of people’s working time is spent online. According to a report by the 
European Commission (2017), the use of digital technologies has increased significantly in 
the last 5 years in more than 90% of workplaces in the EU and most jobs now require at least 
basic computer skills. 
That said, the digital world differs from its offline counterpart in ways that have 
important consequences for people’s online experiences and behavior. We will proceed by 
outlining several ways in which online ecologies do not resemble offline environments. A 
systematic understanding is required not only to fill the gaps in knowledge of the 
psychologically relevant aspects of the digital world, but also to ensure that psychological 
                                                 
3
 Ubiquitous computing describes technology that, by virtue of its pervasiveness in everyday life, has become 
invisible to people (Weiser, 1991). 




interventions take into account the specifics of these new environments and the particular 
challenges that people are likely to face there. First steps have already been made. Marsh and 
Rajaram (2019) identified 10 properties of the Internet—including accessibility, unlimited 
scope, rapidly changing content, and inaccurate information—which they organized into 
three categories: (1) content (what information is available), (2) Internet usage (how 
information is accessed), and (3) the people and communities that create and spread the 
content (who drives information). They argued that these properties can affect cognitive 
functions such as short-term and long-term memory, reading, and social influence. Other 
relevant classifications summarizing the differences between online and offline environments 
in the context of social media include those provided by McFarland and Ployhart (2015)
4
 and 
Meshi, Tamir, and Heekeren (2015)
5
.  
We expand on these classifications by focusing on two broad types of differences 
between online and offline ecologies: differences in structure and functionality and 
differences in perception and behavior (i.e., how people perceive the online and offline 
worlds and how their behavior might differ accordingly). A list of characteristics of online 
environments can be found in Table 2, which is followed by a detailed discussion of each 
characteristic. 
 
                                                 
4
 McFarland and Ployhart (2015) outline eight discrete ambient stimuli that distinguish social media contexts 
from nondigital contexts: physicality, accessibility, latency, interdependence, synchronicity, permanence, 
verifiability, and anonymity. 
5
 Meschi et al. (2015) propose six features that impact the ways users interact: user identity, information format, 
text length, network connections, spatial distance, and temporal scale (p. 7). 





Characteristics of Online Environments 
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONALITY PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR 
Group sizes 
 
Amount of information, limitless space and storage 
 
Rapid change and adaptivity 
 
Intelligence, personalization, and datafication 
 
Choice architectures and the power of design 
Social cues and communication 
 





Self-disclosure and privacy behavior 
 
Norms of civility 
 
Perception of reality 
 
 
2.1. Differences in Structure and Functionality  
Group sizes: There are currently more than 4.3 billion people and around 26 billion devices 
connected to the Internet.
6
 Digital technologies have changed the public sphere, connecting 
people separated in both time and space and creating the “digital public” (Bunz, 2014). 
Indeed, one of the predominant uses of the Internet is for communication. The social web 
boasts impressive numbers of users: Facebook alone has 2.4 billion active monthly users 
(Facebook, 2019), and the Chinese WeChat more than 1 billion (Tencent, 2019). According 
to Our World in Data, “social media platforms are used by one-in-three people in the world, 
and more than two-thirds of all internet users” (Ortiz-Ospina, 2019). Online, one can 
                                                 
6
 See We Are Social, DataReportal, and Hootsuite (2019); IHS (2016). Although digital technologies are 
increasingly accessible, almost half of the world’s population, mainly in low-income regions, does not yet have 
access to the Internet. This skewedness also extends to content production, which is mostly generated in 
developed countries across Europe and North America: “the global North is characterized by the greatest levels 
of participation and is creating the bulk of digital content, while the global South contributes very little. Africa, 
in particular, is almost entirely omitted from these processes of digital generativity” (Graham, De Sabbata, & 
Zook, 2015, p. 97). 




broadcast a message to a nearly unlimited audience, whereas in face-to-face communication 
there are physical limits to how many people can join a conversation (Barasch & Berger, 
2014). Yet even though social media enables people to establish larger social networks and 
profit from greater global connectivity, the structures of communities and the number of close 
friends people have online do not significantly differ from their offline counterparts (Dunbar, 
Arnaboldi, Conti, & Passarella, 2015).
7
 In online social networks, the average numbers of 
friends (between 100 and 200) as well as number of friends who are considered to belong to 
the two closest circles (typically around five and 15, respectively) do not differ from the 
values of offline inner circles (Dunbar et al., 2015; Dunbar, 2016). This suggests that the 
cognitive and temporal constraints that “limit face-to-face networks are not fully 
circumvented by online environments” (Dunbar, 2016, p. 7).  
Amount of information, limitless space and storage: Digital environments are not 
subject to the same constraints on information proliferation and storage found in physical 
surroundings. Online space is virtually limitless, contains several layers (e.g., surface web 
and dark web), and can grow at a high pace. Consider that when Sergey Brin and Larry Page 
launched Google in 1998, they archived 25 million pages. In 2013 that number had grown to 
30 trillion and by 2016 to more than 130 trillion individual pages (Schwartz, 2016). At the 
time of writing in 2019, there were 1.7 billion websites on the Internet and approximately 4.8 
                                                 
7
 There is a cognitive limit on the size of natural face-to-face social networks, which is thought to be determined 
by a combination of constraints on available social time and cognitive bounds. According to this approach (the 
social brain hypothesis; Dunbar, 1998), cognitive constraints are related to the size of the neocortex and 
associated information-processing capacity which, in primates, correlates closely with the typical size of social 
groups. In humans, this suggests a social circle of about 150 people, with hierarchical levels reflecting both 
emotional closeness and interaction frequency. These layers have values that approximate five (closest friends, 
a.k.a. “support clique”), 15 (“sympathy group”), 50, and 150, and extend beyond this in at least two further 
layers to 500 and 1,500 (Dunbar, 2016).  




billion Google searches a day.
8
 Moreover, the potential for speed and scope of information 
propagation is much higher online, where the same message can be effortlessly and 
immediately copied to reach vast audiences. For example, the most shared tweet to date 
reached 4.5 million retweets
9
, most of which happened in the 24 hours after the initial 
posting. New technologies have made processing and storing information superior to any 
previously available storage system (Clowes, 2013). This feature of digital technology also 
implies that information does not have an expiration date and can be stored more or less 
indefinitely—a situation that prompted the European Union to establish what is commonly 
referred to as the “right to be forgotten,” which provides European citizens with a legal 
mechanism for ordering the removal of their personal data from online databases (General 
Data Protection Regulation, 2018, Article 17). 
Rapid change and adaptivity: Digital environments develop at a high rate, especially 
compared to most offline environments. The document-based Web 1.0 was replaced by the 
more interactive Web 2.0 in the beginning of the 2000s, and increasingly more sophisticated 
and AI-powered web of data is being introduced (Aghaei, Nematbakhsh, & Farsani, 2012; 
Fuchs et al., 2010). Online content can be added, removed, or changed in seconds and digital 
architectures can rapidly adapt to new demands and challenges. Even small changes in 
structures of online architectures can have major societal consequences: For example, 
introducing some friction into the process of sharing information (i.e., increasing the 
investment in time, effort, or money required to access or spread information) can 
significantly decrease the likelihood of citizens engaging with the affected sources, as the 
Chinese government’s attempt to manage and censor information shows (see Roberts, 2018). 
                                                 
8
 Based on estimates from https://www.internetlivestats.com. 
9
 It is a tweet by Japanese billionaire Yusaku Maezawa, who promised on January 5, 2019 to give away 100 
million yen ($924,000) to be shared among 100 random people (Twitter & Wikipedia, 2019). 




Clicks and likes—as insignificant as they may seem individually—can collectively amount to 
sizable changes (e.g., for election results).  
Intelligence, personalization, and datafication: The latest developments in the 
evolution of the Internet increasingly depend on datafication (the transformation of many 
aspects of the world and people’s lives into data10) and mediation of content by algorithms 
and other intelligent technologies. Increasing datafication leads to increasing surveillance and 
control over people’s information diets (Zuboff, 2019), while rapidly developing machine 
intelligence technology spurs a gradual relinquishing of public control as well as unclarity 
surrounding the technology itself. For example, search engines and recommender systems 
(e.g., video suggestions on YouTube) routinely rely on machine-learning systems that 
outperform humans in many respects (e.g., RankBrain in Google). Such algorithms are both 
complex and nontransparent—sometimes for designers and users alike (Burrell, 2016). The 
opacity of machine-learning algorithms stems from their autonomous and self-learning 
character: They are given input and produce output, but the exact processes that generate 
these outputs are hard to interpret. This has led some to describe these algorithms as “black 
boxes” (Rahwan et al., 2019; Voosen, 2017). Modern-day online environments, unlike their 
offline counterparts, possess autonomous intelligence—be it pure domain-specific machine 
intelligence, crowdsourced human intelligence, or a powerful combination of both.  
Choice architectures and the power of design: Another feature that distinguishes 
online environments from physical surroundings is the ubiquity and the power of the design 
that mediates people’s online experience. The design of an interface where people encounter 
the complexity of interconnected information online—the “human interface” (Berners-Lee, 
                                                 
10
 “This means not just demographic or profiling data, but also behavioural metadata, such as those 
automatically derived from smartphones, like time stamps and GPS-inferred locations” (Kennedy, Poell, & van 
Dijck, 2015, p. 1). 




Cailliau, Groff, & Pollermann, 1992)—presupposes that it has a decisive role in how people 
perceive the information presented. In other words, there is no Internet without ubiquitous 
choice architectures that constrain, enable, and steer user behavior (see Table 1). This very 
nature of online platforms affords quick design of choice architecture: It might take several 
years to make a city bike-friendly (e.g., by building new bike lanes), but adjusting default 
settings on online pages or introducing friction into the process of information sharing can 
take less than a day. However, the same flexibility and adaptability of online choice 
architectures that benevolent choice architects can use to promote positive behavior can also 
be manipulated by commercial and ill-meaning actors. 
2.2. Differences in Perception and Behavior  
Social cues and communication: Online communication differs from face-to-face 
communication in several ways, including the potential for anonymity and asynchronicity, 
the ability to broadcast to multiple audiences, and the availability of audience feedback 
(Misoch, 2015). Another characteristic of online communication that was emphasized in 
early research into Internet communication concerns the lack of nonverbal or physical cues—
such as body language or vocal expressivity—that are important for conveying and 
understanding emotion in face-to-face communication. This raised concerns that increased 
use of computer-mediated communication would lead to impoverished social interaction (the 
reduced social cues model; e.g., Kiesler, Siegel, & McGuire, 1984). However, it has now 
been recognized that users adapt to the medium and substitute the lack of nonverbal cues in 
digital communication with other verbal cues, thereby achieving equal levels of affective 
content (Walther, Loh, & Granka, 2005; Walther, Van Der Heide, Ramirez, Burgoon, & 
Peña, 2015). Online environments also contribute to the development of social cues, offering 
additional nonverbal cues such as emoticons, “likes,” and shares to enrich online 
communication. However, social cues can mean different things to users and platforms: To a 




user, a “like” button signifies appreciation or attention; to a tech firm it is a useful data point. 
In addition, digital social cues can leak more, and more sensitive, information than people 
intend to share (e.g., sexual orientation, personality traits, political views), including 
information that can be exploited to psychologically target and manipulate users (Kosinski, 
Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013; Matz et al., 2017).  
Reliability of information and cues for epistemic quality: Information available online 
often lacks not only the typical social cues found in face-to-face interaction, but also the cues 
to its epistemic quality that are generally available offline, such as an indication of sources or 
authorship. One reason for this is that the Internet—“an environment of information 
abundance”—is no longer subject to traditional filtering through professional gatekeepers 
(Metzger & Flanagin, 2015, p. 447). Modern-day digital media replaces expert gatekeeping 
with either crowdsourced gatekeeping (e.g., Wikipedia) or automated gatekeeping (e.g., 
algorithms on social media; Tufekci, 2015). Although some online platforms deliberately 
construct information ecosystems that favor indicators of quality (e.g., references to sources, 
fact-checking) and have rules for content creation (e.g., Wikipedia, 2019), much of the 
content shared on social networks and online blogs does not give users sufficient cues to 
judge its reliability. For example, the length of messages on Twitter “encourages short 
declarative statements absent of supporting arguments [so that] users do not become 
suspicious of unreferenced assertions” (NATO StratCom, 2017, p. 16). Moreover, 
manipulative use of certain cues can lead to dubious or outright false claims and ideas being 
disseminated—for instance, by creating fake news websites, impersonating well-known 
sources and social media accounts, inflating emotional content (Crockett, 2017), or creating 
an illusion of consensus (Yousif, Aboody, & Keil, 2019).  
Social calibration: The Internet can also affect social calibration—that is, perceptions 
about the prevalence of opinions in the general population. Offline, one gathers information 




about how others think based on the limited number of people one interacts with, most of 
whom live nearby. In the online world, physical boundaries cease to matter; one can connect 
with people around the world. One consequence of this global connectivity is that small 
minorities of people can form a seemingly large, if dispersed, community online. This in turn 
can create the illusion that even extreme opinions are widespread—thereby contributing to 
“majority illusion” (Lerman, Yan, & Wu, 2016) and “false consensus” effects (the perception 
of one’s views as relatively common and of opposite views as uncommon; Leviston, Walker, 
& Morwinski, 2013; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). It is difficult to meet people in real life 
who believe the Earth is flat, whereas online among Facebook’s billions of users there are 
some who do share this belief—or other equally exotic ones—and they can now find and 
connect with each other. 
Self-disclosure and privacy behavior: The emergence and development of new online 
environments has consequences not only for how people communicate with others or how 
they evaluate information but also for the way they disclose information about themselves. 
Early studies on self-disclosure (revealing personal information to others) reported higher 
levels of sharing in visually anonymous computer-mediated communication than in face-to-
face communication (Joinson, 2001; Tidwell &Walther, 2002). People also tend to be more 
willing to disclose sensitive information in online surveys with reduced social presence of the 
surveyor (Joinson, 2007). A systematic literature review by Nguyen, Bin, and Campbell 
(2012) reported mixed evidence: While most experimental studies (four of six) that measured 
self-disclosure showed more disclosure in online than in face-to-face interactions, in survey 
studies participants reported more disclosure and willingness to share information with their 
offline friends (six of nine surveys). One may speculate that while it is the level of closeness, 
trust, and depth of interactions that prompts people to disclose personal information in offline 
relationships, the anonymity afforded by online communication is what can enhance people’s 




willingness to share. The benefits of online anonymity include the elimination of hierarchical 
markers (e.g., gender and ethnicity) that may trigger hostility (Young, 2002) and a sense of 
control people have over the information they share that stems from a belief that it will not be 
linked to their real personas. However, this sense of control can backfire. For example, one 
study showed that increasing individuals’ perceived control over the release and access of 
private information can increase their willingness to disclose sensitive information (“the 
control paradox”; Brandimarte, Acquisti, & Loewenstein, 2013). Another paradox in people’s 
privacy behavior online is the “privacy paradox”: On one hand, people claim to care a great 
deal about their online privacy, but on the other, they show little concern for it in their actual 
behavior (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015; see Kokolakis, 2017 for a review). 
One potential reason for this discrepancy between what people say about online privacy and 
what they actually do is the lack of transparency and understanding surrounding how online 
platforms collect and use people’s data and what can be inferred from that data (Kosinski et 
al., 2013). 
Norms of civility: The “online disinhibition effect” describes “a lowering of 
behavioral inhibitions in the online environment” (Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2012, p. 434) that 
is not seen offline. Online disinhibition can be both benign and toxic (Suler, 2004): It can 
inspire acts of generosity and help shy people socialize, but it can also lead to increased 
incivility in online conversations—a behavior “that can range from aggressive commenting in 
threads, incensed discussion and rude critiques, to outrageous claims, hate speech, and more 
severe forms of harassment such as purposeful embarrassment and physical threats” (Antoci, 
Bonelli, Paglieri, Reggiani, & Sabatini, 2018, p. 3). One of the most common examples of 
incivility is trolling, a type of online harassment that involves “posting inflammatory 
malicious messages in online comment sections to deliberately provoke, disrupt, and upset 
others” (Craker & March, 2016, p. 79). Trolling can be used strategically to disrupt the 




possibility of constructive conversation (see also Section 3.4). Incivility is pervasive online: 
A survey by the Pew Research Center revealed that 44% of Americans have personally 
experienced online harassment, while 66% have witnessed it being directed at others 
(Duggan, 2017). Although incivility in online comments can polarize how people perceive 
issues in the media (Anderson et al., 2014) and can disproportionally affect female politicians 
and public figures (Rheault, Rayment, & Musulan, 2019), it seems to be perceived as the 
norm, rather than the exception, for online interaction (Antoci, Bonelli, Paglieri, Reggiani, & 
Sabatini, 2019). Relatively little is known about the causes of these phenomena. One may 
speculate that actions in the online sphere might be perceived as less impactful: For instance, 
insulting and even threatening anonymous users in online forums may be perceived as less 
harmful and consequential for both the victim and the perpetrator than threatening someone 
to their face. 
Perception of reality: In contrast to the offline world, the Internet and social media are 
immaterial, virtual environments that do not exist outside of the human-created technology 
that supports them (McFarland & Ployhart, 2015). One consequence of this separation is the 
potential to construct multiple realities for different audiences and media online (Waltzman, 
2017), so that any reference to the objective truth and shared reality is replaced by alternative 
narratives (e.g., “systemic lies” created to promote a hidden agenda; McCright & Dunlap, 
2017). The impact of the Internet on the media landscape—along with several other factors, 
such as rising economic inequality and growing polarization—is likely to have contributed to 
the emergence of the “post-truth” environment, an alternative epistemic space “that has 
abandoned conventional criteria of evidence, internal consistency, and fact-seeking” 
(Lewandowsky, Ecker & Cook, 2017, p. 360). In this alternative post-truth reality, deliberate 
falsehoods can be described as “alternative facts” and politicians and media figures (on both 
sides of the Atlantic) can claim that “objectivity is a myth which is proposed and imposed on 




us” (Yaffa, 2014), that “there is no such thing as fact anymore” (Holmes, 2016) or that “truth 
isn’t truth” (Pilkington, 2018, see also Lewandowsky & Lynam, 2018; Lewandowsky, in 
press-b). These environments are conducive to the dissemination of false news and rumors, 
which in turn undermines public trust in any information and erodes the basis of shared 
reality (Watts & Rothschild, 2017), thereby creating an atmosphere of doubt that serves as a 
fertile ground for conspiracy theories (more on this in Section 3.4).  
To summarize, online and offline worlds differ in psychologically and functionally 
relevant ways. The online world appears to trigger perceptions that can render it different 
from the offline world. When people and online architectures are brought into contact 
(without much public oversight and democratic governance), pressure points will emerge. We 
next review four such challenges: persuasive and manipulative choice architectures, AI-
assisted information architectures, distractive environments, and the proliferation of false and 
misleading information.  
  




3. Challenges in Online Environments 
Table 3 
Map of Challenges 
Persuasive and manipulative choice 
architectures 
 
 Persuasion versus manipulation 
 Dark patterns 
 Privacy-intruding defaults 
Section 3.1; Figure 2 
AI-assisted information architectures 
 
 Personalization and customization 
 Algorithmic gatekeeping 
 Algorithmic biases  
 User profiling and targeted advertising 
Section 3.2; Figure 4 
Distractive environments  
 
 Information overload and attention 
economy 
 Virtual Skinner boxes and schedules 
of reinforcement 
 Multitasking and distracted minds 
 
Section 3.3; Figure 4 
False and misleading information 
 
 Types and sources of false and 
misleading information  
 Strategies for content creation and 
dissemination  
 Specifics of false information 
dissemination in online networks 
Section 3.4; Figures 5,6 
 
3.1. Persuasive and Manipulative Choice Architectures 
Modern online environments are replete with smart, persuasive choice architectures that are 
designed primarily to maximize financial return for the platforms, capture and sustain users’ 
attention, monetize user data, and predict and influence future behavior (Zuboff, 2019). For 
example, Facebook’s business model relies on exploiting user data to the benefit of 
advertisers; the goal is to maximize the likelihood that an ad captures its target’s attention. In 
order to stretch the time people spend on the platform (thus producing behavioral data and 
watching ads), Facebook employs a variety of design techniques that aim to change users’ 
attitudes and behavior by means of persuasive choice and information architectures (e.g., 
Eyal, 2014; Fogg, 2003). It is no coincidence that notifications are red; the color incites a 
sense of urgency. The “like” button triggers a quick sense of social affirmation. The 




bottomless news feed, with no structural stop to scrolling (i.e., infinite scroll), prompts people 
to consume more without noticing. These examples illustrate that persuasive choice 
architectures rely on an understanding of human psychology and extensive use of commercial 
nudging. Benefiting from an abundance of data on human behavior, these architectures are 
continuously being adapted to offer ever more appealing user interfaces in order to compete 
for human attention (e.g., Harris, 2016).  
The main ethical ambiguity of persuasive choice architectures and commercial 
nudging resides in their close ties to other types of influence, such as coercion and, in 
particular, manipulation. Coercion is a type of influence that does not convince its targets, but 
rather compels them by eliminating all options except for one (e.g., take-it-or-leave-it 
choices). Manipulation is a hidden influence that attempts to interfere with people’s decision-
making processes in order to steer them toward the manipulator’s ends. It neither persuades 
people nor deprives them of their options; instead, it exploits their vulnerabilities and 
cognitive shortcomings (Susser, Roessler, & Nissenbaum, 2018). Manipulation thus 
undermines both people’s control and their autonomy over their decisions—that is, their 
sense of authorship and their ability to identify with the motives of their choices (e.g., 
Dworkin, 1988). It also prevents people from choosing their own goals and pursuing their 
own interests. Not all persuasive choice architectures are manipulative—only those that 
exploit people’s vulnerabilities in a nontransparent, covert manner. Below we consider two 
cases where persuasive design in online environments borders on manipulation: dark patterns 
and hidden privacy defaults. 
“Dark patterns”—a term coined by designer and user-experience researcher Harry 
Brignull (see Brignull, 2019; Gray, Kou, Battles, Hoggatt, & Toombs, 2018; Mathur et al., 
2019) are a manipulative and ethically questionable use of persuasive online architectures. 
“Dark patterns are user interface design choices that benefit an online service by coercing, 




steering, or deceiving users into making unintended and potentially harmful decisions” 
(Mathur et al., 2019, p. 1). One notorious example of dark patterns is the “roach motel,” 
unglamorously named after devices used to trap cockroaches. The roach motel makes it easy 
for users to get into a certain situation, but difficult to get out (in Figure 2 it falls under the 
type “hard to cancel”). Many online subscription services function that way. For instance, 
creating an Amazon account requires just a few clicks, but deleting it is difficult and time-
consuming. The user must first hunt for the hidden option of deleting an account, then request 
this procedure by writing to customer service. This asymmetry in the ease of getting in and 
out is persuasive and retains customers. Another example is “forced continuity”: 
subscriptions that, after an initial free trial period, continue on a paid basis without notifying 
users in advance and without giving them an easy way to cancel the service.
11
 
Dark patterns are anything but rare. In a recent large-scale study, Mathur et al. (2019) 
tested automated techniques that identified dark patterns on a sizeable set of websites. They 
discovered 1,818 instances of dark patterns from 1,254 websites in the data set of 11,000 
shopping websites. Mathur et al.’s findings revealed 15 types of dark patterns belonging to 
seven broader categories (see Figure 2), such as misdirection, applying social pressure, 
sneaking items into the user’s shopping basket, and inciting a sense of urgency or scarcity (a 
strategy often used by hotel booking sites or airline companies). 
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Figure 2. Categories and types of dark patterns. 
Source: Dark Patterns Project at Princeton University, https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/dark-
patterns, Mathur et al. (2019). 





Another case of persuasive design that borders on manipulation is hidden default 
settings. Hidden defaults present a particularly strong challenge because they trick people 
into accepting settings without being fully (if at all) aware of the consequences. For example, 
online platforms are often designed to make it difficult to discontinue personalized 
advertising or choose privacy-friendly settings. Default data-privacy settings do not even 
have to follow dark patterns strategies: Most users, lacking the time or motivation to go 
several clicks deep into the settings labyrinth, will not change their defaults unless they have 
a specific reason to do so. Hidden defaults raise clear ethical concerns, but these practices 
continue despite the introduction of the GDPR in Europe in 2018, which stresses the 
importance of privacy-respecting defaults and insists on a high level of data protection that 
does not require users to actively opt out of the collection and processing of their personal 
data (General Data Protection Regulation, 2018, Article 25).  
Not everyone complies. According to a report by the Norwegian Consumer Council 
(2018), tech companies such as Google, Facebook, and, to a lesser extent, Microsoft, use 
design choices in “arguably an unethical attempt to push consumers toward choices that 
benefit the service provider” (p. 4). On the topic of privacy, the report’s key findings include 
the use of privacy-intrusive default settings (e.g., Google requires that the user actively go to 
the privacy dashboard in order to disable personalized advertising), framing and wording that 
nudges users towards a choice by presenting the alternative as ethically questionable or 
highly risky (e.g., on Facebook: “If you keep face recognition turned off, we won’t be able to 
use this technology if a stranger uses your photo to impersonate you”), giving users the 
illusion of control (e.g., Facebook allows users to control whether Facebook uses data from 
partners to show them ads, but not whether the data are collected and shared in the first 
place), take-it-or-leave-it choices (e.g., a choice between accepting the privacy terms or 




deleting an account), and design of choice architectures where choosing the privacy-friendly 
option requires more effort from the users (Norwegian Consumer Council, 2018). 
In sum, persuasive designs and commercial nudges can go far beyond transparent 
persuasion and enter the territory of hidden manipulation when they rely on dark patterns 
(Mathur et al., 2019), default settings that intrude on user privacy (Norwegian Consumer 
Council, 2018), and the exploitation of people’s biases and vulnerabilities (Susser et al., 
2018). These practices impact not only how users access information but also what 
information they agree to share. Moreover, online manipulation undermines people’s control 
and autonomy over their decisions by nudging them toward behaviors that benefit 
commercial actors, or by hiding relevant information (e.g., settings for discontinuing 
personalized advertisement). 
3.2. AI‐Assisted Information Architectures 
Another challenge of online information and choice architectures comes with the use of 
machine learning and smart algorithms. We use the term AI‐assisted information 
architectures to describe a variety of AI-powered algorithmic tools that filter and mediate 
information online. These tools include personalized targeted advertising, personalized 
recommender systems, algorithmic filtering in search engines, and customized news feeds on 
social media (see Figure 3 for an overview). Algorithmic filtering and personalization are not 
inherently malicious technologies—on the contrary, they are helpful tools that allow people 
to navigate the overwhelming amount of information on the Internet. Instead of showing 
countless random results for search queries, search engines aim to offer the most relevant 
results. Googling “Newcastle” in Sydney, Australia, should prioritize information about the 
city that is 200 km to the north, not its distant British namesake. In a similar vein, news feeds 
on social media strive to show news that is interesting to users. Recommender systems offer 
content suggestions based on users’ past preferences and the preferences of users with similar 




tastes (e.g., video suggestions on Netflix and YouTube). Besides selecting information based 
on its personalized relevance, algorithms can also filter out information that is considered to 
be harmful or unwanted, for instance by automatically filtering spam or flagging hate speech 
and disturbing videos. There are countless examples of why filtering information on the 
Internet is indispensable and helpful and why automation makes this daunting process more 
efficient. Automated algorithmic systems act as buffers between the abundance of 




Figure 3. Examples of AI-assisted information architectures online. 
One general problem is that decision making is being delegated to a variety of 
algorithmic tools without clear oversight, regulation, or an understanding of the mechanisms 
underlying the resulting decisions. For example, ranking algorithms and recommender 




systems are considered proprietary information and therefore neither individual users nor 
society in general has a clear understanding of why information in search engines or social 
media feeds is ordered in a particular way (Pasquale, 2015). Other factors contribute further 
to the lack of transparency, such as the inherent opacity of machine-learning algorithms (the 
black box problem) and the complexity of algorithmic decision-making processes (de Laat, 
2018; Diakopoulos, 2015; Turilli & Floridi, 2009). Delegating decision making this way not 
only results in impenetrable algorithmic decision-making processes, it also precipitates 
people’s gradual loss of control over their personal information and a related decline in 
human agency and autonomy (Anderson & Rainie, 2018; Mittelstadt, Allo, Taddeo, Wachter, 
& Floridi, 2016; Zarsky, 2016).  
Consistent delegation of choice and shifting autonomy from users to algorithms leaves 
open the question of responsibility and accountability. Since artificial agents are capable of 
making their own decisions and since no one has decisive control over their actions, it is 
difficult to assign responsibility for the outcomes (e.g., the responsibility gap; see Matthias, 
2004). Consider the decisions of a recommender system employed on YouTube (boasting 
about 1.6 billion users, it is the second most visited website in the US and worldwide
12
). The 
recommender algorithm—based on deep neural network architecture—offers video 
recommendations to YouTube users with the predominant purpose of increasing watching 
time (Covington, Adams, & Sargin, 2016). However, one unintended consequence happened 
to be that the system promoted videos that tended to radicalize their viewers with every step. 
For example, Tufekci (2018) reported how after showing videos of Donald Trump during the 
2016 presidential campaign, YouTube started to recommend and autoplay videos featuring 
white supremacists and Holocaust denialists. After playing videos of Bernie Sanders, 
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YouTube suggested videos on left-wing conspiracies (e.g., that the U.S. government was 
behind the September 11 attacks). There is now evidence suggesting that these algorithms 
may have actively contributed to the rise and unification of right-wing extremists in the US 
(Kaiser & Rauchfleich, 2018), Germany (Rauchfleisch & Kaiser, 2017), and Brazil (Fisher & 
Taub, 2019); it is unlikely that these are the only affected countries. Who, then, should be 
held accountable for decisions made by autonomous recommender systems that suggest ever 
more radical content on YouTube: the developers of the algorithms, the owners of the 
platforms, or the content creators? YouTube recently vowed to limit recommending 
conspiracy theories on its platform (Wong & Levin, 2019), in a move that highlights the tech 
industry’s unilateral power to shape their users’ information diets. 
Another closely related concern is the impact of AI-driven algorithms on choice 
architectures—for instance, when algorithms function as gatekeepers, deciding what 
information should be presented and in what order (Tufekci, 2015). Be it personalized 
advertising or filtering information to present the most relevant items, the results directly 
impact people’s choices by both narrowing their options (Newell & Marabelli, 2015) and 
steering their decisions in a particular direction. The consequences loom large for societies as 
a whole as well as for individuals: Epstein and Robertson (2015) argued that search engine 
rankings that favor a particular political candidate can shift voting preferences of undecided 
voters by 20% or more. 
Microtargeted advertisement on social media, especially in the context of political 
campaigning, is another case in point. This method relies on automated targeting of messages 
based on people’s personal characteristics (as extracted from their digital footprints) and a 
use of private information that stretches the notion of informed consent (e.g., psychographic 
profiling; see Matz et al., 2017). The resulting microtargeted political messages, which are 
seen only by the targeted user, can exploit people’s psychological vulnerabilities while 




evading public oversight. The impact of this manipulation on the outcomes of the Brexit vote 
and the 2016 U.S. election is a major cause for concern and an argument for stricter 
regulation of online platforms (e.g., Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2019; 
Jamieson, 2018; Persily, 2017). A majority of social-media users in the US (62%, n = 4,594) 
agree that it is not acceptable for social media platforms to use their data to deliver 
customized messages from political campaigns (Smith, 2018b). The impact of microtargeting 
is often exacerbated by the lack of transparency in political campaigning on social media: It 
is nearly impossible to trace how much has been spent on microtargeting and what content 
has been shown (e.g., Dommett & Power, 2019).  
Another challenging consequence of algorithmic filtering is algorithmic bias (e.g., 
Bozdag, 2013; Corbett-Davies, Pierson, Feller, Goel, & Huq, 2017; Fry, 2018). Here ethical 
concerns touch upon both the generation of biases in data processing and the societal 
consequences of implementing biased algorithmic decisions, such as discrimination 
(Mittelstadt et al., 2016; Rahwan et al., 2019). One particularly disturbing set of examples 
concerns deeply rooted gender or racial biases that can be picked up by data-processing 
algorithms. One study of personalized Google advertisements demonstrated that setting the 
gender to female in simulated user accounts resulted in fewer ads related to high-paying jobs 
than did setting it to male (Datta, Tschantz, & Datta, 2015). Another study found that online 
searches for “black-identifying” names were more likely to be associated with advertisements 
suggestive of arrest records (e.g., “Looking for Latanya Sweeney? Check Latanya Sweeney’s 
arrests”; Sweeney, 2013). Striking examples of racial biases in algorithmic decision making 
are not limited to online environments; they also have consequential effects offline, for 
instance in policing and health (e.g., Obermeyer, Powers, Vogeli, & Mullainathan, 2019). 
Algorithms are designed by human beings, and they rely on existing data generated by 
human beings. They are therefore likely to not only generate biases due to technical 




limitations but also reinforce existing biases and beliefs (Bozdag, 2013), which in turn can 
deepen ideological divides and exacerbate political polarization. Relatedly, it has been argued 
that personalized filtering on social media platforms may be instrumental in creating “filter 
bubbles” (Pariser, 2011) or “echo chambers” (Sunstein, 2017). Echo chambers are 
information environments “in which individuals are exposed only to information from like-
minded individuals” (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015, p. 1130) while filter bubbles refer 
to content selection “by algorithms according to a viewer’s previous behaviors” (p. 1130). 
Both echo chambers and filter bubbles tend to amplify the confirmation bias—a way to 
search for and interpret information that reinforces preexisting beliefs and increases political 
polarization (e.g., Bail et al., 2018) and radicalization.
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3.3. Distractive Environments 
We now turn to still another challenging aspect of online environments: the way they shape 
not only information search and decision making but also people’s ability to concentrate and 
allocate their attention efficiently. As early as 1971, Herbert Simon understood that in an 
information-rich world, the abundance of information goes hand in hand with a scarcity of 
attention on the part of the individuals and organizations that consume information: “A 
wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention 
efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it” (Simon, 
1971, pp. 40–41). Information overload and scarcity of attention became even more salient 
with the rapid evolution and proliferation of the Internet and media technologies. The original 
goals behind the web were first, to create a user interface that would facilitate access to 
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information and second, to simplify the process of information accumulation in the 
interconnected online space (Berners-Lee, et al., 1992). Organizing information and making 
it accessible is also Google’s official mission statement (Google, 2019).  
However, as new informational environments evolved and business models of Internet 
companies were refined, the goals and incentives of Internet design shifted as well. Human 
collective attention became a profitable market resource for which different actors compete. 
Fierce competition for human attention has led to the growing fragmentation of collective 
attention, with ever greater proliferation of novelty-driven content and shorter attention 
intervals allocated to particular topics (Lorenz-Spreen, Mønsted, Hövel, & Lehmann, 2019). 
By analyzing the dynamics of collective attention that is spent on cultural items like Twitter 
hashtags, Google queries, or Reddit comments, Lorenz-Spreen, Mønsted, et al. (2019) 
showed that across the last decades, the rate at which the popularity of items decreased or 
increased has grown. For example, in 2013, a hashtag on Twitter was popular on average for 
17.5 hours; in 2016 it lasted only 11.9 hours. The authors’ explanation is that when the excess 
of information meets limited attentional capacities, the thirst for novelty leads to accelerated 
ups and downs for each item and a higher frequency of alternating items. In other words, the 
amount of collective attention allocated to each single topic is decreasing and more topics are 
attended to in the same amount of time.  
Changing economic incentives in the zero-sum race for finite human attention also 
affects the way modern Internet technologies are designed to be appealing, addictive, and 
distractive (see also Harris, 2016). Take, for instance, Facebook, which provides users with 
many types of rewards, including positive feedback in the form of “likes” and shares, social 
reinforcements in messages and comments, and friend requests. As Meshi et al. (2015) noted, 
“even minimalistic cues of social success such as these may activate our brain’s reward 
system, and keep us coming back to Facebook for more” (p. 774)—not unlike in Skinner’s 




operant-conditioning experiments with rats and pigeons (“virtual Skinner boxes”; Davidow, 
2013), but this time with humans as the subjects. There is ongoing speculation that Internet 
companies are using behaviorist research on operant conditioning and schedules of 
reinforcement (e.g., Ferster & Skinner, 1957) to reward and maintain desired online behavior 
(e.g., playing video games or checking updates on social media). According to the operant-
conditioning approach, the strength of behavior depends not only on the reinforcement, but 
also on the intervals or schedules upon which rewards are delivered. While fixed schedules 
depend on rewards being delivered at predictable time intervals (fixed-interval schedules) or 
after a certain number of attempts (fixed-ratio schedules), in variable-interval schedules 
reinforcements are delivered at time intervals that are unpredictable from a subjective 
perspective (e.g., checking text messages that arrive at unpredictable times). Variable-ratio 
schedules involve reinforcement after an average (but not fixed) number of responses (e.g., 
winning a prize after a variable number of attempts; see Figure 4). Both variable schedules 
are known to create a steady rate of responding, with variable-ratio schedules producing the 
highest rates of responding and variable-interval schedules producing moderate response 
rates (Domjan, 2018, p. 119). It seems that if rewards are difficult to predict, people tend to 
increase the rate of a particular behavior, perhaps hoping to eventually attain the desired 
reward.  





Figure 4. Four classes of schedules of reinforcement.  
The operant conditioning chamber (also known as the Skinner box) was used to study animal behavior 
by teaching an animal (e.g., a rat) to perform certain actions (e.g., pressing a lever) in response to a 
controlling stimulus (e.g., a light signal) reinforced by a reward (e.g., food). Different schedules of 
reinforcement were studied to see which would create steady and high rates of response behavior. By 
analogy, “virtual Skinner boxes” such as social media or online gaming offer their users rewards (e.g., 
likes or reaching another level in a game) at varying intervals to reinforce and maintain the desired 
behavior. 
 
Gambling, slot machines, and lottery games are typically evoked as examples of 
variable-ratio schedules that maintain behavior efficiently (e.g., Thorens, Wullschleger, 
Khan, Achab, & Zullino, 2012). Online gaming is another example of the principles of 
behavioral conditioning being used to maximize user commitment (Ducheneaut, Yee, 
Nickell, & Moore, 2006). Wu (2016), Harris (2016) and several others have argued that the 




same intermittent reinforcement mechanisms are also used by online applications such as 
Facebook or Twitter. Jonathan Badeen, cofounder of online dating app Tinder, recently 
acknowledged that its algorithms were inspired by this behaviorist approach (Reynolds, 
2019). Reinforcements in those cases are messages, likes, matches, comments, or any 
desirable content that is delivered at irregular intervals and that prompts users to constantly 
refresh their feeds and check their inboxes. 
 Furthermore, while the amount of information generated on the Internet has increased 
exponentially, people’s ability to process this information has not (see also Bozdag, 2013). 
Research on limited attention shows that people’s information processing is inevitably 
limited and selective, so that allocating attention to one task tends to decrease attention to 
another (e.g., Dukas, 2004; Kahneman, 1973). In the online world, the ability to concentrate 
becomes even more compromised when one’s surroundings are full of distractive stimuli that, 
by buzzing, ringing, or flashing, constantly call for attention. Moreover, digital environments 
are no longer constrained to desktop screens but are becoming increasingly integrated in 
people’s daily routines through a variety of smart devices. Unsurprisingly, these 
environments, which breed distraction and interruption, lead to “distracted minds” (Gazzaley 
& Rosen, 2016). Even the mere presence of a smartphone can occupy attentional resources 
and reduce cognitive ability (Ward, Duke, Gneezy, & Bos, 2017), and smartphone 
notifications disrupt performance on attention-demanding tasks even when people are not 
actively attending to their phone, arguably due to mind-wandering (Stothart, Mitchum, & 
Yehnert, 2015).  
Media multitasking—simultaneously attending to several media sources, such as TV, 
text messages, and websites—is becoming more and more common among not only younger 
but also older generations (Rosen, 2008). Studies of high school and university students 
showed that the typical student could not stay focused on a task for more than 3 to 5 minutes 




without checking their messages or browsing the web (Rosen, Carrier, & Cheever, 2013); in 
addition, multitasking is particularly pronounced when people read digitally rather than in 
print (Carrier, Rosen, Cheever, & Lim, 2015). Studies on multitasking show that switching 
attention between tasks instead of concentrating on one specific task not only increases the 
time spent on a task but also negatively affects performance (Uncapher & Wagner, 2018).
14
  
3.4. False and Misleading Information  
A final challenge presented by online environments and social networks is the increasing 
speed and scope of false information proliferation and its resulting threat to the rationality 
and civility of public discourse and, ultimately, to the very functioning of democratic 
societies. A recent report by Bradshaw and Howard (2019) reveals the extent of the problem: 
In the last two years alone, the number of countries with disinformation campaigns has more 
than doubled, and Facebook remains the main platform for those campaigns. There is much 
concern that the spread of false news and rumors on Facebook and Twitter influenced the 
outcomes of the U.S. presidential election and the Brexit referendum in 2016 (see House of 
Commons, 2019; Persily, 2017). For example, the infamous Pizzagate conspiracy alleging 
that Hillary Clinton and her top aides were running a child-trafficking ring out of a 
Washington pizzeria was floated during the 2016 presidential campaign on Reddit, Twitter, 
and fake news websites. It led to repeated harassment of the restaurant’s employees and 
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 The evidence, however, is mixed: The link between multitasking and cognitive control (distractibility) turns 
out to be weaker than previous studies have suggested (see Wiradhany & Nieuwenstein, 2017 for a replication 
study and a meta-analysis). The general discrepancy in findings is also highlighted in the literature review on 
minds and brains of media multitaskers by Uncapher & Wagner (2018). At the same time, the authors of the 
review concluded that in light of the current evidence (both convergent and divergent), heavier media 
multitaskers exhibit poorer performance in a number of cognitive domains (e.g., working memory; Uncapher & 
Wagner, 2018).  




eventually prompted an armed 28-year-old man to open fire inside the pizzeria (Aisch, 
Huang, & Kang, 2016). Even more disturbingly, the Myanmar military orchestrated a 
propaganda campaign on Facebook that targeted the country’s Muslim Rohingya minority 
group, inciting violence that forced 700,000 people to flee (Mozur, 2018). Encrypted 
messenger networks such as WhatsApp are also vulnerable to manipulation: False rumors 
about child kidnappers shared in Indian WhatsApp groups in 2018 incited at least 16 mob 
lynchings, leading to the deaths of 29 innocent people (Dixit & Mac, 2018). 
As these examples illustrate, dangerously misleading online content might proliferate 
due to deliberate attempts to manipulate public opinion or emerge as an unintended 
consequence of sharing unverified rumors and false news. Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) 
used information falseness and intent to mislead to distinguish between three types of 
“information disorders”15: misinformation (false or misleading content shared without 
malicious intent), disinformation (false, fabricated, or manipulated content shared with intent 
to mislead or cause harm), and mal-information (genuine information shared with intent to 
cause harm, e.g., hate speech and leaks of private information). While this classification 
establishes some useful general distinctions, the landscape of online falsehoods and 
propaganda is much more complicated. For example, the difference in intent between 
misinformation and disinformation is often hard to establish and the real consequences of 
both can be equally harmful. Hence, they are usually both considered to be false information 
—or, if presented as news, referred to by the now-common moniker “fake news.” Moreover, 
there are additional categories of misleading content, such as online political propaganda and 
“systemic lies” (McCright & Dunlap, 2017); the latter are created and curated by organized 
groups with vested interests (e.g., fossil fuel companies denying climate science). Creating 
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 Reference to “disorder” in this context does not mean that the blame is shifted to the user but rather denotes 
that information disorders are not there by design; they emerge as malfunctions in a healthy flow of information.  




and disseminating false information relies on several common practices, which can be 
catalogued and used to develop tools to counteract misinformation (e.g., inoculation; see 
Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2019 and Section 5.4). Here we list the main categories 
(Figure 5) of false and misleading information in the digital sphere, as well as sources and 
strategies used for its creation and dissemination (Figure 6), which we have compiled based 
on a wide range of sources (indicated in the figures). 
 
 
Figure 5. Types of false and misleading information in the digital world. 





Figure 6. Sources and strategies of false and misleading information in the digital world. 
Propaganda, rumors, conspiracy theories, and other kinds of misleading information 
are not new phenomena, nor are they exclusive to online environments (see Uberti, 2016). In 
1275, England’s First Statute of Westminster outlawed spreading false news, stating that 
“none shall report slanderous news, whereby discord may arise” (c. 34). Numerous fake news 
stories were published in newspapers in the 19th century, including the Great Moon hoax 
published in New York tabloid The Sun in 1835. However, what distinguishes online 
propaganda and misinformation is the new medium itself. Besides having the capacity to 
spread misinformation further and faster, online environments offer new tools for 
computational propaganda that rely on the combination of algorithms and automation (e.g., 
bots) with human curation to flood social media networks with misleading and polarizing 
content (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019; Woolley & Howard, 2017). Incentives for creating this 




content are often financial: Recent findings by the Global Disinformation Index (2019) 
showed that online ad spending on disinformation domains amounted to $235 million a year.  
The scope and speed with which false information proliferates online is deeply 
connected to the nature of online networks (Bounegru, Gray, Venturini, & Mauri, 2018). 
Recent research has found that false rumors on Twitter spread faster, deeper, and broader 
than does truth, arguably because their novel, highly emotional nature appeals to people 
(Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018).
16
 This is in line with findings showing that people are more 
likely to share messages featuring moral-emotional language (Brady, Wills, Jost, Tucker, & 
Van Bavel, 2017). As Crockett (2017) argued, in the context of competition for human 
attention, digital media may promote the expression of negative emotions such as moral 
outrage “by inflating its triggering stimuli, reducing some of its costs and amplifying many of 
its personal benefits” (p. 769). In addition, the digital context exacerbates the problem due to 
the absence of reliable cues to the epistemic quality of information and shifts in the meaning 
of habitual social cues (see Section 2.2).  
Unfortunately, people are not particularly skilled at evaluating the trustworthiness of 
information they encounter online. Research in education suggests that young people struggle 
with many aspects of finding reliable information online—from selecting search results to 
judging whether a site is trustworthy. Students tend to ignore the source of information, have 
difficulties distinguishing between traditional news and sponsored content, and evaluate sites 
based on superficial features such as graphic design and authoritative logos (Barzilai & 
Zohar, 2012; Wineburg & McGrew, 2019; McGrew, Breakstone, Ortega, Smith, & 
Wineburg, 2018; Wiley et al., 2009; Wineburg, McGrew, Breakstone & Ortega, 2016).  
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 One may also speculate that false news is so attractive because it exploits the negativity bias—that is, the 
tendency for humans to react more strongly to negative than to positive information (Soroka, Fournier & Nir, 
2019).  




Young people—as “digital natives”—may nonetheless have an advantage over their 
parents when it comes to dealing with rapidly evolving technological landscapes and learning 
new digital skills. A recent study of fake news on Facebook found that Americans over age 
60 were much more likely to visit fake news sites compared to younger people (Guess, 
Nagler, & Tucker, 2019). The same study found that 60% of visits to fake news websites 
were made by just 10% of Americans. A small fraction of users consuming and disseminating 
false information online is also found on Twitter: Grinberg, Joseph, Friedland, Swire-
Thompson, & Lazer (2019) showed that in the 2016 U.S election campaign, fake news on 
Twitter “accounted for nearly 6% of all news consumption, but it was heavily concentrated—
only 1% of users were exposed to 80% of fake news, and 0.1% of users were responsible for 
sharing 80% of fake news” (p. 374). The vast majority of both shares of and exposures to 
fake news were attributable to relatively small fractions of the population (Grinberg et al., 
2019). It should be noted that in this study, the threshold for a news item to be considered 
fake was high; the studies therefore left out many manipulative sources, half-truths, and other 
misleading information techniques. 
It is important to distinguish the susceptibility or even commitment to sharing false 
news and conspiracy theories found in a small part of the population from ignorance or mere 
lack of skills. “Ignorance rarely leads to strong support for a cause, in contrast to false beliefs 
based on misinformation, which are often held strongly and with (perhaps infectious) 
conviction. For example, those who most vigorously reject the scientific evidence for climate 
change are also those who believe they are best informed about the subject” (Lewandowsky, 
Eckert, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012, p. 108). Crucially, not all people who lack 
knowledge about an issue are overconfident, but the opposite is usually the case: for example, 
people who tend to be overconfident about their knowledge about autism and vaccines are 




usually the ones who are the least informed about these topics and doubt expert knowledge 
the most (Motta, Callaghan, & Sylvester, 2018).  
Despite the somewhat uplifting finding that outright false content still represents only 
a small fraction of online information, even a minority opinion can set agendas in “its ability 
to ‘push’ or ‘drive’ the popularity of issues in the broader online media ecosystem” (Vargo, 
Guo, & Amazeen, 2018, p. 2043). Vargo et al.’s study showed that although fake news media 
did not appear to control the whole media landscape in 2014–2016, American partisan media 
(e.g., Fox News) and fake news media were intertwined and influenced each other’s agendas 
across a wide range of topics, including the economy, education, the environment, 
international relations, religion, taxes, and unemployment. During the 2016 election partisan 
media were especially susceptible to fake news agendas. Lewandowsky, Jetter, and Ecker 
(2019) showed that the agenda-setting power of misleading news also extends to the 
American president’s tweets. In response to media coverage he considers threatening (e.g., 
the Mueller investigation), President Trump strategically deploys distraction (e.g., tweeting 
about China, jobs, or immigration) to set the agenda for the mainstream media (e.g., the New 
York Times and ABC News), thus prompting less coverage of the issues he wishes to remove 
from public discourse.  
Finally, people’s perceived exposure to misinformation online is high: In the 
European Union, “in every country, at least half of respondents [in the sample of 26,576] say 
they come across fake news at least once a week” (Directorate-General for Communication, 
2018). In the United States, “about nine-in-ten U.S adults (89%, n = 6,127) say they often or 
sometimes come across made-up news intended to mislead the public, including 38% who do 
so often” (Mitchell, Gottfried, Stocking, Walker, & Fedeli, 2019). This fosters dissatisfaction 






 and erodes trust in democratic institutions. Fifty percent of Americans (n = 
6,127) view made-up news as a major issue in their country and 68% say that fake news 
impacts confidence in government institutions (Mitchell et al., 2019). In Europe, 85% of 
respondents (n = 26,576) think that fake news is a problem in their country and 83% say it is 
a problem for democracy in general (Directorate-General for Communication, 2018). 
 
In this section we have distinguished four groups of challenges to human cognition and 
motivation in online environments. While our focus here has been on urgent challenges to 
people’s agency, self-control, and autonomy of choice, as well as the civility and rationality 
of public discourse and ultimately the functioning of democratic societies, there are many 
other challenges raised by online environments and digital technology that deserve 
psychologists’ attention, such as the nature of the association between social media use and 
individual well-being. The four issues we reviewed are:  
 Human-made, ubiquitous, persuasive and manipulative designs, which rely on dark 
patterns and hidden defaults, challenge the human capacity to exercise autonomous 
and informed choice. These practices affect not only how people access information 
but also—as is the case with privacy-intruding defaults—what information they agree 
to share.  
 AI-assisted information architectures that filter information on the Internet and shape 
personalized information environments reduce agency and autonomy, amplify biases, 
and introduce obscurity into the automated decision-making processes.  
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country; just 45% are satisfied” (Wike, Silver, & Castillo, 2019). 




 The distractive nature of digital media triggers people’s emotional responses and 
consumes their limited attention, thereby hindering people’s capacity for 
concentration and self-control.  
 False and misleading information disseminated through social networks and digital 
media challenge people’s ability to distinguish truth from falsehood, to detect when 
information has been shared with malicious intent, and to participate in civil 
conversation. 
  




4. Behavioral Interventions Online: Nudging, Technocognition, and Boosting 
 
Although challenges loom large, they are not insurmountable. Insights and evidence from 
psychological science permit to point the way to potential remedies. In this section, we 
summarize three types of behavioral and cognitive interventions inspired and informed by 
evidence from psychology that can be applied to the digital world: nudges, technocognition, 
and boosts (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Types of behavioral and cognitive interventions for the digital world. 
 





Nudging is a popular approach to behavioral policy that harnesses the power of choice 
environments and the knowledge of human psychology to design choice architectures in ways 
that steer people’s decisions toward a greater individual or public good (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008). Nudging is based on the insight that it is possible to change people’s behavior without 
changing their minds. Nudging does not block, fence off, or significantly burden choices (as 
laws can do); rather, it proposes interventions that are easy, reversible, and cheap to 
implement. It thus represents a form of soft paternalism, also called libertarian paternalism. 
The target of these interventions is choice architectures (see Table 1 for definition). Nudging 
can be achieved by varying the order in which options are presented, thus changing their 
physical and cognitive accessibility. For example, rearranging food options in a cafeteria so 
that healthier foods are more accessible is meant to increase healthy food consumption (for a 
systematic review see Broers, De Breucker, Van den Broucke, & Luminet, 2017; Bucher et 
al., 2016). The preselected default option is another paradigm of nudging and one of the 
choice architect’s most widely employed tools. Due to the mechanisms of endorsement 
(defaults are seen as signaling what the choice architect wants the decision maker to do) or 
endowment (defaults are perceived to reflect the status quo), people are likely to accept a 
preselected option (Jachimowicz, Duncan, Weber, & Johnson, 2019). Benevolent choice 
architects can harness this tendency for causes serving the public good, such as increasing 
organ donation rates (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; but see Arshad, Anderson, & Sharif, 2019), 
or the good of the individual, such as saving more money for retirement through automatic 
enrollment (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004).  
The same architectural principles, however, can also be used to build online and 
offline choice architectures that benefit service providers rather than consumers. Commercial 
nudging can drive people to inadvertently subscribe to undesirable content or consent to 




privacy settings that are inconsistent with their stated best interests (Section 3.1; see also 
Thaler, 2018 on “sludge”). The success and ethical permissibility of nudging thus largely 
depend on the goals of the choice architects (commercial or public good) and their alignment 
with the goals and values of individuals. Difficulties arise not only in determining people’s 
best interests or true preferences but also in maintaining a balance between what is best for 
different actors (individual decision makers, commercial bodies, political institutions) and 
society at large. Another limitation of nudging is the assumed and actual role of human 
autonomy. Nudges do not eliminate available options and are easily reversible (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008, p. 236). Yet they substitute autonomous choice with preselected “rational” 
decisions in order to overcome people’s cognitive biases and inadequate decision-making 
competences. As Rebonato (2012) argued, even though nominal autonomy might be 
preserved, the effective autonomy (as demonstrated by choices made in the presence of 
defaults) is reduced (but see also Sunstein, 2015). 
A category of nudging that is explicitly respectful of human autonomy is known as 
educative nudges (Sunstein, 2015). As the name indicates, these interventions involve some 
form of education, for instance in the form of additional information such as the nutritional 
quality of foods or the risks of smoking (Sunstein, 2016a; 2016b). In contrast to noneducative 
nudges, these interventions are transparent to people, engage their deliberate faculties and 
preserve autonomy of choice—which may be why people prefer educative nudges. According 
to a nationally representative survey in the United States, a majority of people (between 55% 
and 74% across four topics, n = 430) consistently preferred educative versions of nudges 
when no information about their comparative effectiveness to noneducative nudges was 
presented (Sunstein, 2016a). 
 
 





Technocognition is an approach proposed by Lewandowsky, Ecker, and Cook (2017) 
that offers a “cognitively-inspired design of information architectures” (Lewandowsky, Cook, 
& Ecker, 2017, p. 419). It suggests that a combination of insights from cognitive science and 
appropriate interventions in digital architectures can help in designing technological 
safeguards against the spread of false information or targeted manipulation. In digital 
environments, the power of choice and information architectures on users’ behavior is even 
more significant than in the offline world. No online choice is ever made without predesigned 
context. Technocognition considers this design context through the lens of cognitive science. 
Cognitively inspired technological interventions can, for instance, introduce friction into the 
process of commenting on or sharing of information. As a response to the problem of toxic 
commenting, the Norwegian broadcaster NRK launched an experiment: Before readers could 
post a comment on an article, they had to pass a brief comprehension quiz on what they’d 
read (Lichterman, 2017; Lewandowsky, in press-a). The friction created by increasing the 
entry cost for participating in online discussions is meant to foster deliberate thinking. 
Crucially, no one is censored in the process; once a person passes the quiz they are free to 
comment as usual. Yet this measure, unlike a nudge, does fence off certain behaviors unless 
the quiz is answered correctly. “Trolls,” for example, are unlikely to expend the effort 
required to pass the quiz. 
A simpler version of friction can be used to prevent uncontrolled sharing cascades of 
false and misleading information. Instagram introduced an AI-powered feature in June 2019 
that delays posts containing offensive comments by notifying users that their comment may 
be considered offensive and allowing them to cancel the post (Instagram Info Center, 2019).
 
Messaging app Telegram recently introduced a “slow mode” that enables group 
administrators to impose a wait period before users respond (Telegram Blog, 2019). And 




WhatsApp Messenger’s reportedly successful response to mob lynchings in India (see 
Section 3.4) was to limit the number of times a message can be shared to five chats—a 
feature that now applies to all users (WhatsApp Blog, 2018). The underlying cognitive 
insights in these cases are twofold: First, limiting the number of chats to which a message can 
be forwarded and removing the share button from media posts introduced a delay, or cooling-
off period. Cooling-off periods are known to affect people’s willingness to engage in an 
activity (e.g., see Luca, Malhotra, & Poliquin, 2017 for the effect of cooling-off periods on 
gun violence in the United States). Second, identifying a forwarded message as such provided 
a cue to users that the message originated not from a (potentially trusted) contact but from 
elsewhere. These interventions in the information architecture of social media, while small 
and easy to implement technologically, can have significant effects given the scale of these 
platforms—a promising point for designing appropriate technocognitive solutions in digital 
environments. 
Let us highlight, however, that similar techniques can also be used to restrict freedom 
of choice and communication on the Internet, as can be seen in the case of authoritarian 
regimes that use friction to limit citizens’ access to information (Roberts, 2018). It is 
therefore important to ensure that technocognitive interventions are designed with people’s 
best interests in mind and with public oversight.  
Boosting 
Boosting is another class of cognitive interventions from the psychological science. It 
responds to the challenge of rapidly changing digital environments by aiming to foster lasting 
and generalizable competences in users (see also Hertwig, 2017; Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, 
2017; Hertwig & Ryall, 2019). Boosts target individual cognitive and motivational 
competences rather than immediate behavior (the target of nudges) and aim to empower 
people to make better decisions for themselves in accordance with their own goals and 




preferences. Boosting interventions can be directed at domain-specific (e.g., understanding 
health information) and domain-general competences (e.g., statistical literacy). They can 
target human cognition (e.g., decision strategies), the environment (e.g., information 
representation), or both (Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, 2017, p. 977). Moreover, in contrast to 
nudges, boosts specifically aim not only to preserve but also to foster and extend human 
agency and autonomy. Boosts are also necessarily transparent because they require an 
individual’s active cooperation.  
One example of boosting is a risk-literacy boost that can be employed to quickly 
educate people about relative versus absolute risks in, for instance, the health domain 
(Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2007). While benefits of 
drugs are often expressed in relative terms (e.g., “Drug X reduces the chance of stroke by 
48%”), this information is incomplete and does not permit the user to judge the magnitude of 
the effect—but it suggests that the drug is highly effective. Absolute risk information, in 
contrast, provides easy-to-understand information about the magnitude of the drug’s benefit, 
such as: “Drug X reduces the chance of stroke from 28 in 1,000 to 15 in 1,000”. In this 
framing, the absolute reduction of stroke due to the drug is 13 in 1,000 people, or merely 
1.3%. This risk-literacy boost is a simple, memorable rule—“always ask for health statistics 
to be translated into absolute numbers”—that can help people make more informed decisions 
about their health. 
Boosting cognitive competences via the environment might involve changing the way 
information is presented to users or providing additional cues to existing information in order 
to improve the epistemic quality of online content (Lorenz-Spreen, Lewandowsky, Sunstein, 
& Hertwig, 2019). For example, such informational boosts can draw on research in 




algorithmic detection of false rumors (e.g., Vosoughi, Mohnsenvand, & Roy, 2017
18
) in order 
to design visual aids (e.g., information icons on social media posts) that represent hidden cues 
such as a post’s propagation dynamics—that is, to make cues to the veracity of information 
both visible and transparent. This type of intervention can improve the credibility of digital 
information and help people make better decisions (for more examples, see Lorenz-Spreen, 
Lewandowsky et al., 2019). Importantly, this additional information introduced in the 
environment is easily accessible but does not restrict users’ choices or activities. People can 
decide for themselves how much they want to engage with these information labels. In 
contrast to boosts that aim to foster long-term competences, information labels are short-term 
interventions that provide quick and context-appropriate information. However, if one 
encounters them repeatedly, the development of long-term competences could be spurred. 
To summarize, one can distinguish between a range of interventions, all informed by 
psychological science and behavioral sciences, that can be harnessed to respond to the four 
challenges of online environments outlined earlier. Conceptualizing and studying these 
interventions is a task of the highest order. As long as regulators fall behind the speed of 
change in digital environments and are hamstrung by the political power of Big Tech, 
interventions informed by scientific evidence will be crucial. We next turn to a map of 
boosting interventions in digital environments.  
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5. Boosting Cognitive Competences in Online Environments 
Table 4 







Self-imposed interventions in one’s 
proximal digital choice architecture. 
 
Section 5.1, Figure 8 
Deliberate ignorance 
Conscious choice to not seek information. A 
strategic way of filtering information in 









Simple decision aids 
Simple strategies and decision aids to 
improve people’s ability to efficiently 
analyze the information they encounter 
on the web.   
Section 5.3, Figures 9, 10 
Inoculation 
A preemptive intervention that boosts 
people’s cognitive resistance to 
misinformation and online manipulation. 
 
Section 5.4, Table 5, Figure 11 
 
The interventions we review here are designed to satisfy two constraints simultaneously: to 
remedy specific problems in the digital world while also building on existing or fostering new 
competences. While some interventions focus on people’s internal cognitive and motivational 
competences, others target people’s competences to restructure the external choice 
architecture of the digital environment in a way that enhances their own agency and 
autonomy. An important point is that different tools are adapted to counter specific 
challenges. For instance, social media exploit humans’ reward sensitivity to cultivate hard-to-
control habits that platforms capitalize on. Knowing this, the best response to manipulative 
and persuasive choice architecture might be to become one’s own choice architect (self-
nudging; Section 5.1) or to restrict engagement with certain information sources (deliberate 
ignorance; Section 5.2), rather than attempting to exercise a superhuman ability to detect and 
resist all attempts at influence. By contrast, false information and AI-powered persuasive 
techniques such as targeted political advertisement can best be met by people exercising 




existing competences (e.g., reasoning) or learning new ones (e.g., lateral reading; section 
5.3). We thus identify two main groups of cognitive boosting tools: (1) those aimed at 
enhancing people’s agency and autonomy in their digital environments (e.g., self-nudging 
and deliberate ignorance) and (2) those aimed at boosting reasoning and resilience to 
manipulation in order to accurately assess content encountered online (e.g., simple decision 
aids, inoculation, lateral reading).The effectiveness of some of these boosts has already been 
demonstrated experimentally; others are supported by evidence collected from neighboring 
areas of research in behavioral and cognitive sciences (e.g., research on nudging, self-control, 
and the use of simple heuristics in decision making under uncertainty). These evidence-based 
and evidence-informed interventions can be presented to users, educators, and policy makers 
in the form of fact boxes, apps, and policy recommendations. 
5.1. Self-Nudging: Boosting Control Over One’s Digital Environment 
Design of choice architectures that make online environments open to manipulating user 
behavior can also be used by people to foster self-control and motivation. Online 
environments permit—although rarely encourage—a relatively high level of control over 
one’s choice architecture, such as setting one’s own defaults, adjusting notifications, 
installing ad blockers, and organizing one’s digital environment in a way that hinders 
interruptions and undesirable triggers. Users can take control over their digital surroundings 
and exercise freedom and agency by not being passive vis-à-vis their environment. 
Accordingly, successful interventions in persuasive and attention-maximizing environments 
should aim to enhance people’s autonomy and their ability to control and shape their digital 
environments in ways that are consistent with their own goals.  
One type of behavioral intervention that is particularly well suited for this challenge is 
self-nudging, which is a cognitive boost that builds competences by actively enlisting the 
proximate environment (Reijula & Hertwig, 2019). While nudging redesigns choice 




architectures to prompt a behavioral change, self-nudging empowers people to act as their 
own choice architects. For example, one can choose to implement a nudge in one’s own 
kitchen by moving tempting but undesirable foods to harder-to-reach places. In Duckworth, 
Milkman, and Laibson’s (2018) classification of self-control strategies, self-nudging falls into 
the category of self-deployed situational strategies. The approach of self-nudging draws 
inspiration from three sources. First and foremost, it has roots in nudging and its emphasis on 
choice architecture but aims to share the psychological knowledge built into nudges with the 
individual. Self-nudging can therefore benefit from the accumulated evidence on nudges such 
as defaults (e.g., Jachimowicz et al., 2019) or changes in cognitive and spatial accessibility 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Another inspiration for self-nudging comes from research on 
commitment devices stemming from economic theory (Bryan, Karlan, & Nelson, 2010; 
Rogers, Milkman, & Volpp, 2014; Schelling, 1978) and used predominantly to solve self-
control problems. “Commitment devices attempt to enforce people’s voluntarily imposed 
restrictions until they have accomplished their goals, or their voluntarily imposed penalties 
for failing to accomplish their goals” (Rogers et al., 2014, p. 1). In other words, a 
commitment device is a way to lock oneself into doing something that one may otherwise not 
be able to follow through with. One example is to define a health goal such as weight loss 
and to tell as many people as possible about when the goal must be reached and the penalty 
for not reaching it on time (e.g., donating to a political campaign one deeply dislikes). 
Finally, self-nudging also is related to the notion of behavioral stimulus control, employed, 
for instance, in cognitive behavioral therapy to treat insomnia or substance abuse (e.g., 
Edinger, Wohlgemuth, Radtke, Marsh, & Quillian, 2001; see also Griffiths, Kuss, & 
Demetrovics, 2014 for online addiction). Here, strategic changes are introduced in the 
environment in order to manage one’s exposure to stimuli that exercise control over one’s 
behavior. For instance, if a person is triggered by hyperpalatable stimuli (e.g., sugary food or 




distractive YouTube videos), removing them from the proximate environment or making 
them less accessible should strengthen the person’s ability to control their urges. The same 
rationale can also be applied to one’s information diet. In the words of Wendy Wood (2019), 
the key to self-control in the digital domain is in taking control over the contextual cues that 
activate people’s use of technology (e.g., smartphones) and adding friction to make 
undesirable actions (e.g., excessive phone use) more difficult (pp. 234–235). In what follows, 
we briefly review three types of self-nudges that can be enlisted by people to nudge 
themselves away from distracting sources or make their desired options more easily 
available. 
Self-nudging by adapting cognitive accessibility. The Center for Humane Technology 
(2019) suggests several steps that people can take to exercise more control over the time they 
spend on their devices. For example, the variable reinforcement schedule of notifications (see 
Figure 4) can turn checking one’s phone into a powerful habit. People can control these 
distractive stimuli by turning off notifications for anything not coming directly from other 
people (e.g., news apps) or even only allowing notifications from apps used by their most 
important contacts (e.g., enabling notifications for messenger apps they use with friends and 
family but disabling e-mail notifications). They could set specific times in which messages 
can be received, thereby reserving periods of time for concentrated work (see also Newport, 
2016). This measure can also help convert variable schedules of receiving messages to fixed-
interval schedules (which is known to elicit the lowest rates of responding), thereby 
potentially reducing messages’ addictive character. Further advice includes deliberately 
separating applications that, by one’s own standards, improve the quality of time spent online 
(e.g., educational podcasts) and those that do not. This can be achieved by rearranging one’s 
smartphone home screen so that only useful apps (e.g., podcasts and meditation apps, as well 
as tools such as calendars and maps) are displayed on the front page while others (e.g., social 




media, games) are tucked away in folders (see Figure 8, “Adaptive cognitive accessibility”). 
Other self-imposed interventions in one’s digital choice architecture include removing social 
media apps from one’s mobile devices entirely and accessing them from one’s home 
computer only or leaving devices out of sight to reduce the cognitive accessibility of the most 
distracting platforms.  
Self-nudging by adjusting defaults: Defaults are one of the most widely employed 
tools in the choice architecture toolbox and they have considerable impact on decisions 
(Jachimowicz et al’s. 2019 meta-analysis produced a medium-sized effect of d = .68). 
Defaults are fertile ground for self-nudging. People can take control of their digital default 
settings, including privacy settings on social media and settings for personalized 
advertisements (e.g., https://myactivity.google.com). While it might initially require some 
time, effort, and possibly even guidance to understand how default settings work and their 
considerable effect on people, self-command over defaults may prove to be a powerful way 
to return agency and autonomy to users (see Figure 8, “Adjusting defaults”).  
Self-nudging with the help of technology: One can also make use of external apps 
(e.g., Digital Wellbeing, Cold Turkey, Freedom, and Boomerang; see Figure 8, “Using 
technology”) that allow users to control how much time they spend on their phone, to 
schedule e-mails, or to block all notifications for a period of time in order to maintain focus. 
Being in control, the self-nudger decides which goals and tools to prioritize and which to 
move to the background.  





Figure 8. Self-nudging interventions in online environments.  
A summary of potential self-nudging interventions to enhance people’s control over their digital 
environments and their privacy protection online. Based in part on Center for Humane Technology 
(2019) and Epstein (2017). 
All these interventions aim to enhance users’ control over their digital environments 
and digital lives. Self-nudging is particularly suited to situations when exercising self-control 
or resisting temptation is difficult, or when a choice environment is toxic (i.e., when choice 
architects design highly addictive environments with nonbenevolent goals in mind; see 
Hertwig, 2017). Moreover, self-nudging enhances autonomy, as it aims to put people in 
charge of determining their own goals and choice environments, thus bypassing the 
paternalism that can accompany the kind of nudging that capitalizes on people’s deficiencies 
rather than attempting to educate them. “Self-nudging means that people intentionally nudge 
themselves in order to self-regulate their behavior and break self-destructive habits […]. 




When the nudger and the nudged are one and the same person, as in the case of self-nudging, 
autonomy and agency remain intact” (Hertwig, 2017, p. 155). A sense of agency is crucial for 
self-nudging, as is an awareness of the existing environmental challenges and a certain level 
of understanding of psychological mechanisms involved. As a Pew Research Center survey 
shows, more users who think they have more control over their news feeds than users who 




Let us also highlight the potential limitations of self-nudging. Although a perceived 
sense of control is crucial for exercising agency, it should be backed up by appropriate 
affordances in the environment. As discussed previously, persuasive design can create an 
illusion of control while still nudging users away from privacy-friendly choices (e.g., 
Norwegian Consumer Council, 2018; Section 3.1). Moreover, increasing individuals’ 
perceived control over the release and access of private information can, paradoxically, 
increase their willingness to disclose sensitive information (“the control paradox”; 
Brandimarte et al., 2013). For example, users can have a strong feeling of control on 
Facebook because they can change their default privacy settings and adjust who will see what 
type of information in their profiles. At the same time, they have very little control over the 
way in which the information they share will be used by the platform, by third-party 
applications, or even by their friends. We hold that self-nudging efforts should be 
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 “Half (50%) of Facebook adopters who think users have a lot of control over their news feeds have 
themselves attempted to influence the content they see there. But that share falls to 40% among those who think 
users have only a little control over the content of their feeds, and to 24% among those who think they have no 
control” (Smith, 2018a). 




complemented by reasonable regulations and online tools
20
 that not only give users more 
control over their digital environments but also ensure that personal information is protected 
regardless of users’ actions.  
5.2. Deliberate Ignorance as Information Management Device 
In 1807, Thomas Jefferson condemned the “polluted vehicle” of newspapers, claiming that 
“the man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who reads them; 
inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer to truth than he whose mind is filled with 
falsehoods and errors” (Jefferson, 1999, p. 275). The current challenge of information 
overload and environments designed to compete for human attention by offering rewards and 
hyperpalatable stimuli brings new significance to this statement. Moreover, in modern 
societies many schemes for the cultural production of ignorance have evolved, including the 
organized campaigns that undermine scientific consensus around climate change in order to 
divert public attention and policy initiatives (Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008). Technological 
advances and control over the Internet (and thus over immense audiences) have further 
bolstered massive, orchestrated attempts to produce ignorance and put the very existence of 
objective truths into question (see Section 2.2). The flooding technique is one method for 
producing ignorance. The Chinese government is estimated to create and post about 448 
million social media comments per year—not to address controversial issues or even argue 
with critics of the party and the government, but rather to divert attention from real issues 
(e.g., natural disasters and the government’s lackluster response) towards trivial and 
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 Rose-Stockwell (2018) argued that social media could provide users with curation tools for their own 
algorithmic filtering, such as prioritizing posts from family members, diversifying the spectrum of political 
news shown, ordering news chronologically, or filtering out posts filled with moral outrage. MIT Social Media 
Lab has developed a social media aggregator with filters that users can control called Gobo: 
https://www.media.mit.edu/projects/gobo/overview/. 




scandalous stories that are injected online for the sole purpose of distracting the public from 
objective coverage of government weaknesses (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017; Roberts, 2018).  
Modern-day readers of digital media face a constant trade-off between staying 
informed about current events and being exposed to an information environment in which 
numerous players (e.g., companies, advertisers, media, and policy makers) design 
hyperpalatable mental stimuli to hijack people’s limited attention. Much as obesogenic 
environments are replete with foods designed to offer maximal sensory pleasure, 
informationally fattening environments degrade consumers’ control and autonomy over the 
information they consume (Crawford, 2015). Take, for illustration, the Kardashian sisters, 
who found fame on a reality television show. The lifestyles they present in the media are 
carefully curated to appear as desirable as possible (e.g., signaling wealth and beauty) and 
lure in viewers. The Kardashians are to information what sugary soda is to nutrition: Neither 
offers much value to the consumer. When low-quality clickbait stories, conspiracy theories, 
and fake news masquerade as meaningful information, epistemic abstinence becomes more 
rational than epistemic indulgence. In other words, more information is not always better. In 
order to manage information overload, one must ignore a large amount of incoming material 
and separate useful information from noise, false news, or harmful advice. In this context, 
deliberate ignorance can be used as a tool for information management (Hertwig & Engel, 
2016; Hertwig & Engel, in press). 
The idea that deliberate ignorance can be an ecologically rational strategy does not 
agree with classical ideals of epistemic virtue and rationality (see Kozyreva & Hertwig, 
2019), which presume that information and knowledge have intrinsic value for decision 
makers because they allow them to accumulate more evidence (e.g., Carnap, 1947), acquire 
better understanding, and ultimately make more informed and rational choices (e.g., 
Blackwell, 1953; Good, 1967). However, real-world decision makers are boundedly rational 




agents, constrained not only by their cognitive limitations but also by their choice 
environments (Simon, 1990). (This does not prevent people from making good decisions 
under uncertainty and time constraints; see Hertwig, Pleskac, Pachur, & The Center for 
Adaptive Rationality, 2019.) Moreover, the expansion of new artificial environments packed 
with information and noise casts additional doubts on how applicable classical rationality is 
to modern-day humans (see also Floridi, 2015). 
People deliberately ignore information for various purposes: for example, to avoid 
emotional costs (e.g., choosing not to test for a rare genetic disease), to benefit from strategic 
ignorance (e.g., in negotiations) or to insure impartiality of judgment (e.g., in blind auditions; 
for these and many more examples see Hertwig & Engel, 2016, in press). We suggest that 
using deliberate ignorance as an individual information management device can also be 
extended to the digital world. As Hertwig and Engel (2016) argue: “For humans, who are 
hardwired to monitor their environment, the ability to allocate one’s limited attentional 
resources reasonably is therefore becoming increasingly valuable in today’s world. Indeed, 
the ability to select a few valuable pieces of information and deliberately ignore others may 
become a core cultural competence to be taught in school like reading and writing” (p. 364). 
One information environment where deliberate ignorance can be a helpful and rational 
tool is online health information. Facing a flood of low-quality sources, people are at risk of 
becoming victims of bad health advice or even conspiracy theories.
21
 Tempting, highly 
unrepresentative, and possibly even misleading environments are difficult to navigate. One 
ecologically rational strategy in such environments is to abstain from seeking out these 
narratives, to avoid searching for one’s symptoms in search engines, and to ignore health 
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 For instance, online narratives from parents reporting adverse effects of vaccines appear to be an important 
source of doubt about vaccination safety (the “narrative bias”; Betsch, Haase, Renkewitz, & Schmid, 2015; 
Haase & Betsch, 2012). 




advice from influencers, celebrities, or commenters in online forums. One could instead 
choose to consult only trusted medical professionals and/or one or two reliable websites that 
provide evidence-based health information. Perhaps unsurprisingly, high-quality health 
information is relatively rare online, making the ability to intentionally ignore low-value 
persuasive sources an important skill. For example, Oxman and Paulsen (2019) identified 
only three (yet not consistently adapted for the public use and access) websites that met their 
inclusion criteria for evidence-based aggregation of health information: Cochrane Evidence, 
Informed Health, and PubMed Health. The next step would be to make the information on 
these websites publicly accessible and easily understandable (e.g., in fact boxes; see 
McDowell, Rebitschek, Gigerenzer, & Wegwarth, 2016). 
Let us emphasize that we are not advocating for the proliferation of ignorance, echo 
chambers, and a return to the Dark Ages. An informed public remains the cornerstone of 
democracy and widespread education is one of its highest achievements. Moreover, the 
accessibility of information offered by the Internet should be regarded as a public good. Our 
emphasis in discussing deliberate ignorance as a tool for information management is on its 
strategic use by consumers of information to shield themselves from the excesses, sticky 
traps, and information disorders of current modern digital environments. This strategy 
appears to be particularly suitable for online environments and sources that convey low-
quality information. To this end, adaptive and sound deliberate ignorance strategies require, 
somewhat ironically, knowledge—such as an understanding of what constitutes a reliable 
indicator of quality and trustworthiness. Auspiciously, Pennycook and Rand (2019) 
demonstrated that laypeople—on average and across the political spectrum—are quite good 
at distinguishing between lower and higher quality sources and place more trust in media 
outlets with stronger editorial norms than in hyperpartisan and fake news sources.  




In sum, introducing strategic changes in one’s digital choice architectures (e.g., 
defaults, arrangement of options) can be an efficient way to counteract challenges associated 
with persuasive and attention-maximizing environments. It can also be used to improve 
people’s information diets and diminish their exposure to false information and information 
that provokes negative emotions such as anger or outrage. Another strategy that aims to 
preserve autonomy in digital information environments that lure users into surrendering their 
time and attention spans is deliberate ignorance. When used in an informed way, deliberate 
ignorance can be a powerful information-management tool that protects people from the 
excesses of an attention-grabbing information landscape but also shields them from 
encountering false or manipulative news. Next, we turn to other boosting tools that can help 
counteract misinformation and online manipulation of public opinion.  
5.3. Simple Decision Aids: Boosting Digital Information Literacy  
One aspect of digital information literacy is the ability to analyze and evaluate the 
information people encounter online. Simple strategies and decision aids can help people do 
this. The idea is to foster good habits that are as simple and automatic as washing one’s hands 
or scanning the crosswalk before making a turn (Caulfield, 2018). One way to design such 
simple tools makes use of a skillset of professional fact-checkers, who are experts in 
evaluating the truthfulness of information. In order to develop a set of rules based on this 
skillset, researchers from the Stanford History Education group asked participants 
(professional fact-checkers, n = 10; history professors, n = 10; undergraduate students, n = 
25) to evaluate the trustworthiness of information online (Wineburg & McGrew, 2019). 
Wineburg and McGrew (2019) argued that the key to experts’ success in fact-checking is 
their strategy of lateral reading, a heuristic rule that allows them to “read less and learn more” 
by looking to verify the claim outside of the original post. Contrary to the professors and 
students, who focused on the information source itself, fact-checkers (who were the most 




successful group of participants across several fact-checking tasks) spent most of their time 
verifying the source and the evidence behind the claim by checking information about it on 
the web.
22
 In a similar vein, Graves (2017) attested that the key to professional fact-checkers’ 
analysis lies “in discovering a claim’s origin and reconstructing its spread” (p. 525).  
Drawing inspiration from expert strategies, researchers in the Stanford History 
Education Group then identified simple rules (see Figure 9) geared at boosting the 
competence of civic online reasoning. This competence is defined as “the ability to 
effectively search for, evaluate, and verify social and political information online” (McGrew 
et al., 2019, p. 2) and it includes three subcompetences: evaluation of the source, evaluation 
of the evidence, and lateral reading. One way of representing these competences is through 
simple questions such as those featured in Figure 9 (Breakstone et al., 2018, p. 221). McGrew 
et al. (2019) found that after two 75-minute lessons on evaluating the credibility of online 
sources (an extended version of the three rules outlined above), students in the treatment 
condition (n = 29) were more than twice as likely to score higher at posttest of their online 
reasoning skills than at pretest, while students in the control condition (n = 38) were equally 
likely to score higher at posttest than at pretest, indicating that the intervention was 
successful. 
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 “The biggest lesson we learned from watching these experts: They evaluated unfamiliar websites by leaving 
them. For fact checkers, the direct route to credibility was indirect” (Wineburg & McGrew, 2019, p. 45). “When 
fact checkers encountered an unfamiliar website, they immediately left it and read laterally, opening up new 
browser tabs along the screen’s horizontal axis in order to see what other sources said about the original site’s 
author or sponsoring organization. Only after putting their queries to the open web did checkers return to the 
original site, evaluating it in light of the new information they gleaned. In contrast, students approached the web 
by reading vertically, dwelling on the site where they first landed and closely examining its features—URL, 
appearance, content, and “About” page—without investigating who might be behind this content” (Breakstone 
et al., 2018, p. 220).  







Figure 9. Simple rules for online reasoning.  
Based on research by the Stanford History Education Group: Breakstone, McGrew, Smith, Ortega, & 
Wineburg, 2018; McGrew, Smith, Breakstone, Ortega, & Wineburg, 2019; Wineburg & McGrew, 
2019. 
 
Another example of simple decision aids that can be designed to foster better 
information literacy online are fast-and-frugal decision trees (FFTs; Martignon, 
Katsikopoulos, & Woike, 2008; Luan, Schooler, & Gigerenzer, 2011).
 
Already in use in a 
variety of domains, including medicine, finance, law, and management, FFTs provide 
comprehensive prescriptive guides for real-world decision making (Hafenbrädl, Waeger, 
Marewski, & Gigerenzer, 2016). They rank decision criteria in the order of importance and 
offer a potential exit at each point. To make a decision, a person goes through the cues 
sequentially. For example, a simple decision tree can be used for triage in hospital emergency 
rooms in order to quickly categorize patients into those who need immediate medical 




attention and those whose treatment can be delayed (one such system, called simple triage 
and rapid treatment, was used in New York City hospitals during the World Trade Center 
attack in 2001; see Cook, 2001). Cues in this case are framed as questions: Is the patient 
walking? If yes, delay treatment; if no, proceed to the following cue. Implementing and 




There are not many examples of simple decision aids for the online domain. But one 
short intervention has already been applied to improve people’s ability to use linguistic cues 
to distinguish between authentic and fictitious online reviews (Banerjee, Chua, & Kim, 
2017). Similarly, FFTs could be designed and tested as decision aids to choices such as 
whether to trust information encountered online. In Figure 10, we offer an example of a 
potential decision tree based on the rules for fact-checking identified by Breakstone et al. 
(2018) and Wineburg and McGrew (2019). The FFT advances through the cues sequentially 
and ends when the answer is “no,” which indicates that the information is not trustworthy and 
should not be shared. FFTs work best with strong cues or signals, but in some cases a 
combination of weak signals can be used (with the help of the tallying strategy), such as the 
top-level domain (e.g., .com or .gov), how the social media name is spelled, the “about” page, 
and cues for verified accounts or promoted material. However, all these signals must be taken 
with caution. For example, a fishy top-level domain (e.g., com.co) is a signal that the source 
may be untrustworthy, but the opposite is not necessarily true (e.g., a .gov domain does not 
guarantee trustworthiness). Many cues for trustworthiness can be gamed and fake news 
websites can appear as genuine and well designed as the websites of real news organizations. 
                                                 
23
 There is an accessible computerized toolbox for creating, visualizing, and evaluating FFTs called FFTrees 
(Phillips, Neth, Woike, & Gaissmaier, (2017). 




That is why strong negative signals such as an unfamiliar website should be taken seriously, 




Figure 10. “Can you trust this information?”  
This fast-and-frugal decision tree provides users with three crucial steps for evaluating the 
trustworthiness of information online, based on the research by the Stanford History Education Group 
(Breakstone et al., 2018; Wineburg & McGrew, 2019). 
 
Like any cognitive tool in the toolbox of digital decision makers, simple decision aids 
must be used under appropriate conditions. For example, lateral reading is an effective tool 
for verifying the information encountered on a fishy website or social media feed, but it may 
not be the best strategy for reading trusted material that benefits from concentration and focus 
on one source. Similarly, decision trees are appropriate tools for dichotomous decisions (e.g., 
whether to trust or share a news item or not) but they might not be helpful for more complex 
choices that require more sophisticated deliberation. 




5.4. Inoculation: Boosting Cognitive Resilience to Misinformation and Manipulation 
Another cognitive intervention against false information and online manipulation is 
inoculation, also known as “prebunking.” It targets people’s ability to recognize misleading 
or manipulative strategies before they encounter them face-to-face or online. Metaphorically 
speaking, if disinformation is a disorder, then inoculation can immunize people against 
certain strains of false and misleading information. Inoculation is preemptive: It aims to 
expose people to misleading or manipulative strategies and to neutralize their disruptive 
potential before people actually encounter them in the world (for more on the inoculation 
theory see Compton, 2013; McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961). Inoculation differs from 
debunking strategies, which refute false claims only after they have been seen or heard; it is 
thus especially valuable, since disinformation is often resistant to debunking after the fact 
(Cook, Lewandowsky, & Ecker, 2017; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Furthermore, unlike 
topic-specific debunking, inoculation aims to instill recipients’ domain-general competence 
to see through attempts of manipulation (Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2019), making it a 
particularly suitable cognitive strategy when fact-checking or evidence-based refutation is 
costly or unavailable.  
According to Cook et al. (2017) there are two components to inoculation: first, an 
explicit warning about a potential threat of disinformation or manipulation—for example, a 
warning about attempts to cast doubts on the scientific consensus on climate change that 
create a chimerical set of “experts” who disagree with the consensus. The second step refutes 
an anticipated argument, thus exposing the disinformation strategy and rendering its 
deceptive nature transparent. In our climate change example, this could take the shape of an 
illustration and an explanation of a particular deceptive technique used to question a scientific 
consensus or otherwise manipulate the public (Cook et al., 2017, p. 4). In the study by Cook 
et al. (2017), the inoculation consisted of showing participants the “fake experts” strategy 




used by the tobacco industry in the 1960s (a tobacco ad with the text “20,679 Physicians say 
‘Luckies are less irritating’”). The same strategy was used by climate science denialists: The 
Oregon Petition denied human-caused effects on the Earth’s atmosphere and was signed by 
31,000 alleged experts, of whom 99% had no expertise in climate science. By exposing 
participants to a weakened version
24
 of disinformation, this intervention provided them with a 
counterargument. The efficacy of inoculation in preventing acceptance of disinformation has 
been established in several experiments (Cook et al. 2017; van der Linden, Leiserowitz, 
Rosenthal, & Maibach, 2017) and inspired the creation of Bad News, an educational game on 
fake news (Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2018, 2019).  
Table 5 








(e.g., about attempts to 
cast doubts on scientific 
consensus on climate 
change) 
Refutation of an 
anticipated argument 
in a weakened form 
(e.g., an example and an 




(e.g., expose participants 
to the same strategy 





Pre-intervention test  
(e.g., ratings of fake 
news credibility) 
Active learning  
(e.g., the Bad News 
game, which aims to 
present main 
disinformation strategies 
in a weakened, fun way) 
Post-intervention test 
(e.g., credibility ratings 
of fake news) 
 
The Bad News game study aimed to extend the effects of inoculation beyond a 
particular topic (such as climate change) and develop a “broad-spectrum vaccine” against 
disinformation (Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2019, p. 2). It focused on the tactics 
commonly used to produce disinformation, rather than on the content of a specific 
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 Like vaccines, where a weakened version of a virus is administered, a weakened version of disinformation 
does not entail the same level of risk as encountering such disinformation in an uncontrolled setting might. 




disinformation campaign. The study provided an active type of inoculation (see Table 5) by 
having participants play a game (https://getbadnews.com/) in which they learned six 
strategies often used to spread disinformation (based on NATO StratCom, 2017): 
impersonating people or famous sources online, producing provocative emotional content, 
amplifying group polarization, floating conspiracy theories, discrediting opponents, and 
trolling (see also Figure 6). The underlying idea of the game is that people train to become 
expert manipulators by applying different disinformation techniques; in doing so, they 
develop the competence of detecting manipulation, which will help them realize when 
manipulative strategies are being applied to them in the future. The game environment 
represents a weakened form of real-world social media (where people are apt to encounter 
false information). The inoculation effects of the Bad News game were observed by 
comparing pre- and post-intervention credibility ratings of various fake news items (n = 
14,266; d = .52 average across all items). The effects were most pronounced for individuals 
who had been more susceptible to fake news headlines in the first place (d = .89). 
 
Figure 11. Bad News game  




Inoculation aims to boost cognitive resiliance to disinformation and manipulation (van 
der Linden, Maibach, Cook, Leiserowith, & Lewandowsky, 2017). As is the case with all the 
interventions we have discussed, it is an efficient strategy when it fits particular challenges in 
the environment and the cognitive competences involved. Inoculation interventions must be 
based on an understanding of the manipulative strategies being used online and how they 
work. Furthermore, people must be willing to be inoculated—that is, to take the time to learn 
about these techniques. Another limitation of inoculation is that it is ineffective in the face of 
unexpected or novel deceptive techniques. Thus, as with vaccines in the physical world, it 
makes sense to be prepared for the most insidious and common methods of online 
manipulation and to regularly update inoculation techniques. The logic of inoculation could 
be extended beyond misinformation to other challenges—for instance, helping people detect 
manipulation through personalized political advertisement that exploits people’s 
psychological identities and vulnerabilities. This research is currently underway.  
6. Conclusion: From Psychological Science to the Internet for Citizens 
Technological innovations have frequently been associated with dystopian fears. As far back 
as 370 BCE, thinkers such as Socrates were deeply concerned about the detrimental 
consequences of writing:  
In fact, it [writing] will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it: 
they will not practice using their memory because they will put their trust in writing, 
which is external and depends on signs that belong to others, instead of trying to 
remember from the inside, completely on their own. […] Your invention will enable 
them to hear many things without being properly taught, and they will imagine that 
they have come to know much while for the most part they will know nothing (Plato, 
ca. 370 B.C.E/1997, pp. 551–552). 




Today’s concerns about, for instance, the potential effects of Google on memory (e.g., 
Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011) and comprehension, or about digital amnesia or digital 
dementia (e.g., Spitzer, 2012), echo Socrates’s fear of forgetfulness and shallow 
comprehension. Socrates was not wrong—it might well be the case that the capacity of 
human memory has fundamentally changed from the time knowledge was transmitted orally. 
Yet he did not foresee the wide range of benefits—including the invention of the Internet—
that were rendered possible by this new form of communication.  
Honoring this lesson, we are cognizant of the risk of conjuring up dystopian fears. 
The current and future benefits of the digital revolution are immense. Yet there is also a 
growing body of evidence that reveals worrying implications of the digital transformation, 
with at least four aspects of the transformation causing particular concern. First, unlike 
previous communication innovations, which permeated societies on time scales of centuries 
(e.g., writing) or decades (e.g., telephony), today’s digital transformations occur at a 
breathtaking pace. Apps can appear outdated within a few months, and the lifecycle of 
information technologies is notoriously short. The comparatively slow pace of academic 
research, with its cycle of prolonged peer review and revision, cannot fully capture, let alone 
influence, those transformations. Second, the problem of speed is compounded by the degree 
of mutation that technology can undergo. Whereas the psychological affordances of writing 
changed little during the transition from parchment and quill to paper and pencil, new digital 
technologies can create new psychological affordances in an instant. For example, the 
seemingly trivial addition of a “retweet” button has made it possible for a small number of 
people—or indeed, nonhuman “bots”—to trigger global informational cascades (e.g., Bastos 
& Mercea, 2019). Third, the implications of those mutations cannot be anticipated. 
WhatsApp did not anticipate that the ease with which material can be shared would 
contribute to mob killings, and Facebook likely did not anticipate that a platform designed for 




staying in touch with friends and family would end up influencing the outcome of elections 
through dark ads and misinformation (Jamieson, 2018). Finally, and perhaps most troubling, 
is that this digital transformation is occuring in what is largely a regulatory vacuum. There is 
nothing to stop platforms from radically altering their interfaces overnight, with unknown 
consequences for society and democracy—a situation recently brought into focus by 
Facebook’s decision to allow distribution of false statements in political advertisement under 
the dubious argument of free speech protection (Facebook Newsroom, 2019).   
 A recent report by the RAND corporation (Mazarr, Bauer, Casey, Heintz, & 
Matthews, 2019) condensed those concerns into a number of future scenarios, described 
under the umbrella term of the “emerging risk of virtual societal warfare.” Mazarr et al. 
(2019) pointed to associated social trends, such declining faith in institutions that help to 
sustain generally agreed-upon social truths (e.g., the media), weakened measures of social 
capital (e.g., social trust and civic engagement), an increase in partisan polarization across 
many countries, a rise in populist movements and, last but not least, what various scholars 
(e.g., Specter, 2009, p. 33) have described as a sense of alienation and a loss of agency and 
ontological security (Giddens, 1991). People’s trust in social institutions, their interpersonal 
exchanges, the stability and reliability of facts, and even their sense of shared reality are 
being undermined. One of the future digital scenarios considered by Mazarr et al. is entitled 
“The Death of Reality.” Envisaged for 2023, it is the point at which the “ability to 
manufacture seemingly tangible reality from scratch has … become commonplace” (p. 99). 
Present-day antecedents for this scenario can be found in the radical constructivist ontology 
of truth employed by practitioners of “post-truth” discourse (Lewandowsky, in press-b). 
Arguably, this scenario can only materialize within a digital information architecture that 
permits people to personalize all of reality along with their preferences for deodorants.  




The focus of this article has been on challenges that threaten people’s agency, their 
choice autonomy, and the epistemic quality of their information environment. Many other 
challenges exist and new ones are quickly emerging, such as the massive amounts of highly 
plausible but fabricated video and audio material known as “deepfakes” that are further 
deflating confidence in a shared reality. In an increasingly “onlife” world (Floridi, 2014), 
psychological science faces important tasks. One is to measure and understand the 
psychological effects of these revolutionary transformations. Another is to develop and 
design policy interventions that help people cope with the consequences of those 
transformations. Focusing on the four challenges of online environments, we outlined various 
classes of interventions that are informed by the behavioral sciences, then focused in on 
interventions aimed at empowering people; returning a sense of agency to people (e.g., the 
citizen as a choice architect); and fostering autonomy, self-control, and resistance to being 
manipulated in the digital world—in other words, interventions meant to cultivate a sense of 
self-efficacy and ontological security (see Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12. Map of challenges and boosts in the digital world. 




These four types of tools can also be summarized as four simple rules for mindful 
Internet behavior that could become as routine as washing one’s hands or checking for cars 
before crossing the street: 
1. Control and organize your digital environment. Adapt it to your goals. 
2. Learn to ignore and filter out nonessential information. 
3. Make a habit of using simple rules for data privacy and information literacy. 
4. Immunize yourself against the most common and dangerous types of manipulation 
and disinformation. 
For policy makers these rules can mean: 
1. Ensure that users have adequate control over their digital environments and 
personal data. Make it easy for them to take the reins. 
2. Make it easy for people to separate useful information from noise and 
disinformation—for instance, by mandating clear, intuitive indicators of epistemic 
quality. 
3. With the help of researchers, design simple rules for data privacy and information 
literacy and provide them to users. 
4. Monitor common types of online disinformation and manipulation and provide 
appropriate and timely inoculations. 
We have no illusions. There is no single solution for these and many other challenges. 
It is very likely that these interventions will be shown to have some benefits, but only for 
some users. Nevertheless, it is important to start, and soon: Several surveys show that people 
are concerned about data privacy, the spread of false information, political manipulation, and 
online harassment (e.g., Directorate-General for Communication, 2018; Mitchell et al., 
2019).). Any solution will require the orchestrated efforts of regulators, policy makers, 




educators, and users—for instance, boosting people’s ability to control the default parameters 
of their choice architecture should be accompanied by a regulatory framework that takes the 
heterogeneity of users into account. Specifically, the law could be used preventatively to stop 
companies from taking advantage of the fact that some citizens fail to take control of their 
default privacy settings (e.g., the European Union’s GDPR, embracing insights from the 
behavioral sciences, mandates that data controllers can no longer use opt-out as a default for 
obtaining consent to data processing).  
The rules and design of Internet landscapes are predominately dictated by major 
corporations and signal a lack of a coherent regulatory framework for transparent and robust 
user protection. Contrary to promises of the early digital era (e.g., access to information for 
all, empowered minorities, unsuppressed democratic deliberation), citizens find themselves in 
a state of constant information overload, surveillance, manipulation, and digital divide. We 
believe that psychological science must contribute to the long-term goal of designing and 
fostering the “Internet for citizens,” an online world respectful of fundamental human rights 
and values that will require users to learn new competences and make active decisions. One 
may think this is an unrealistic ideal. Yet one need look no further than the digital world itself 
for evidence of the spectacular human ability to learn: Fifty years ago, Neil Armstrong 
became the first person to step onto the moon. And yet he would have been unable to 
navigate the digital world and its technologies with the ease of a nine-year-old today. 
  





Acquisti, A., Brandimarte, L., & Loewenstein, G. (2015). Privacy and human behavior in the age of 
information. Science, 347(6221), 509–514. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa1465 
Aghaei, S., Nematbakhsh, M. A., & Farsani, H. K. (2012). Evolution of the world wide web: From 
WEB 1.0 TO WEB 4.0. International Journal of Web & Semantic Technology, 3(1). 
https://doi.org/10.5121/ijwest.2012.3101 
Aisch, G., Huang, J., & Kang, C. (2016, Decmber 10). Dissecting the #PizzaGate Conspiracy 
Theories. The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/10/business/media/pizzagate.html 
Alexa (2019). youtube.com Competitive Analysis, Marketing Mix and Traffic. 
https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/youtube.com 
Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of 
economic perspectives, 31(2), 211-236. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.211 
Anderson, A. A., Brossard, D., Scheufele, D. A., Xenos, M. A., & Ladwig, P. (2014). The “nasty 
effect”: Online incivility and risk perceptions of emerging technologies. Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication, 19(3), 373–387. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12009 
Anderson, J., & Rainie, L. (2018). Artificial intelligence and the future of humans. Pew Research 
Center. https://www.pewinternet.org/2018/12/10/artificial-intelligence-and-the-future-of-
humans/ 
Antoci, A., Bonelli, L., Paglieri, F., Reggiani, T., & Sabatini, F. (2019). Civility and trust in social 
media. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 160, 83–99. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.026 
Arshad, A., Anderson, B., & Sharif, A. (2019). Comparison of organ donation and transplantation 
rates between opt-out and opt-in systems. Kidney International, 95(6), 1453–1460. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.kint.2019.01.036 




Bail, C. A., Argyle, L. P., Brown, T. W., Bumpus, J. P., Chen, H., Hunzaker, M. B. F., . . . 
Volfovsky, A. (2018). Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political 
polarization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(37), 9216–9221.  
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804840115 
Bakshy, E., Messing, S., & Adamic, L. A. (2015). Exposure to ideologically diverse news and 
opinions on Facebook. Science, 348(6239), 1130–1132. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa1160 
Banerjee, S., Chua, A. Y. K., & Kim, J.-J. (2017). Don't be deceived: Using linguistic analysis to 
learn how to discern online review authenticity. Journal of the Association for Information 
Science and Technology, 68(6), 1525–1538. https://doi.org/10.1002/asi.23784 
Barasch, A., & Berger, J. (2014). Broadcasting and narrowcasting: How audience size affects what 
people share. Journal of Marketing Research, 51(3), 286–299. 
https://doi.org/10.1509/jmr.13.0238 
Barzilai, S., & Zohar, A. (2012). Epistemic thinking in action: Evaluating and integrating online 
sources. Cognition and Instruction, 30, 39–85. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07370008.2011.636495  
Bastos, M. T., & Mercea, D. (2019). The Brexit botnet and user-generated hyperpartisan 
news. Social Science Computer Review, 37(1), 38–54. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439317734157 
Berners-Lee, T., Cailliau, R., Groff, J.-F., & Pollermann, B. (1992). World-wide web: The 
information universe. Internet Research, 20(4), 461–471. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/10662241011059471 
Betsch, C., Haase, N., Renkewitz, F., & Schmid, P. (2015). The narrative bias revisited: What drives 
the biasing influence of narrative information on risk perceptions? Judgment and Decision 
Making, 10(3), 241–264. 




Blackwell, D. (1953). Equivalent comparisons of experiments. The Annals of Mathematical 
Statistics, 24(2), 265–272. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729032 
Bounegru, L., Gray, J., Venturini, T., & Mauri, M. (2018). A Field Guide to 'Fake News' and Other 
Information Disorders. Unpublished manuscript. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3097666 
Bozdag, E. (2013). Bias in algorithmic filtering and personalization. Ethics and Information 
Technology, 15(3), 209–227. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-013-9321-6 
Bradshaw, S. & Howard, P. N. (2019) The global disinformation order: 2019 global inventory of 
organised social media manipulation. Working Paper 2019.3. Retrieved from The 
Computational Propaganda Project, Oxford University website: 
https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/cybertroops2019/ 
Brady, W. J., Wills, J. A., Jost, J. T., Tucker, J. A., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2017). Emotion shapes the 
diffusion of moralized content in social networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 114(28), 7313–7318. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1618923114 
Brandimarte, L., Acquisti, A., & Loewenstein, G. (2013). Misplaced confidences: Privacy and the 
control paradox. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 4(3), 340–347. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550612455931 
Breakstone, J., McGrew, S., Smith, M., Ortega, T., & Wineburg, S. (2018). Teaching students to 
navigate the online landscape. Social Education 82(4), 219–221. 
Brignull, H. (2019). Dark Patterns. https://darkpatterns.org 
Broers, V. J. V., De Breucker, C., Van den Broucke, S., & Luminet, O. (2017). A systematic review 
and meta-analysis of the effectiveness of nudging to increase fruit and vegetable choice. 
European Journal of Public Health, 27(5), 912–920. https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckx085 
Bryan, G., Karlan, D., & Nelson, S. (2010). Commitment devices. Annual Review of Economics, 2, 
671–698. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.economics.102308.124324 




Bucher, T., Collins, C., Rollo, M. E., McCaffrey, T. A., De Vlieger, N., Van der Bend, D., ... & 
Perez-Cueto, F. J. A. (2016). Nudging consumers towards healthier choices: A systematic 
review of positional influences on food choice. British Journal of Nutrition, 115(12), 2252–
2263. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007114516001653 
Bunz, M. (2014). The silent revolution: How digitalization transforms knowledge, work, journalism 
and politics without making too much noise. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Burrell, J. (2016). How the machine ‘thinks’: Understanding opacity in machine learning algorithms. 
Big Data & Society, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951715622512 
Cadwalladr, C., & Graham-Harrison, E. (2018). The Cambridge Analytica files. The Guardian, 
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files 
Carnap, R. (1947). On the application of inductive logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 8(1), 133–148. https://doi.org/10.2307/2102920 
Carrier, L. M., Rosen, L. D., Cheever, N. A., & Lim, A. F. (2015). Causes, effects, and practicalities 
of everyday multitasking. Developmental Review, 35, 64–78. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2014.12.005 
Caulfield, M. (2018, August 31). For online media literacy that works, speed and ease matters. 
Medium. https://medium.com/trust-media-and-democracy/for-online-media-literacy-that-
works-speed-and-ease-matters-896dba85b54c 
Center for Humane Technology (2019). Take control. https://humanetech.com/resources/take-control 
Chesney, R. & Citron, D. K. (2018). Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, 
and National Security. Unpublished manuscript. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3213954 
Clowes, R. W. (2013). The cognitive integration of e-memory. Review of Philosophy and 
Psychology, 4(1), 107–133. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0130-y 




Compton, J. (2013). Inoculation theory. In J. P. Dillard & L Shen (Eds.), The Sage handbook of 
persuasion: Developments in theory and practice. Second edition. pp. 220–236. SAGE 
Publishing. 
Cook, J., Lewandowsky, S., & Ecker, U. K. H. (2017). Neutralizing misinformation through 
inoculation: Exposing misleading argumentation techniques reduces their influence. PLoS 
One, 12(5), e0175799. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175799 
Cook, L. (2001). The World Trade Center attack: The paramedic response: An insider's view. 
Critical Care, 5(6), 301–303. https://doi.org/10.1186/cc1054 
Corbett-Davies, S., Pierson, E., Feller, A., Goel, S., & Huq, A. (2017). Algorithmic decision making 
and the cost of fairness. In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGKDD International Conference 
on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (pp. 797-806). ACM.  
https://doi.org/10.1145/3097983.3098095 
Covington, P., Adams, J., & Sargin, E. (2016, September). Deep neural networks for YouTube 
recommendations. In RecSys’16 Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on recommender 
systems (pp. 191–198). https://doi.org/10.1145/2959100.2959190 
Craker, N., & March, E. (2016). The dark side of Facebook®: The Dark Tetrad, negative social 
potency, and trolling behaviours. Personality and Individual Differences, 102, 79–84. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.06.043 
Crockett, M. J. (2017). Moral outrage in the digital age. Nature Human Behaviour, 1(11), 769–771. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0213-3 
Datta, A., Tschantz, M. C., & Datta, A. (2015). Automated experiments on ad privacy settings. 
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2015(1), 92–112.  
Davidow, B. (2013, June 10). Skinner Marketing: We're the Rats, and Facebook Likes Are the 
Reward. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/06/skinner-
marketing-were-the-rats-and-facebook-likes-are-the-reward/276613/ 




de Laat, P. B. (2018). Algorithmic decision-making based on machine learning from Big Data: Can 
transparency restore accountability? Philosophy & Technology, 31(4), 525–541. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-017-0293-z 
Diakopoulos, N. (2015). Algorithmic accountability: Journalistic investigation of computational 
power structures. Digital Journalism, 3(3), 398–415. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2014.976411 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. (2019). Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final report. 
House of Commons. 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/179102.htm 
Directorate-General for Communication. (2018). Flash Eurobarometer 464: Fake news and 
disinformation online. European Commission. 
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/S2183_464_ENG 
Dixit, P. & Mac, R. (2018, September 9). How WhatsApp Destroyed A Village. BuzzFeed News. 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/pranavdixit/whatsapp-destroyed-village-lynchings-
rainpada-india 
Domjan, M. (2018). The essentials of conditioning and learning. American Psychological 
Association. 
Dommett, K., & Power, S. (2019). The political economy of Facebook advertising: Election 
spending, regulation and targeting online. The Political Quarterly, 90(2), 257–265. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12687 
Ducheneaut, N., Yee, N., Nickell, E., & Moore, R. J. (2006). Building an MMO with mass appeal: A 
look at gameplay in World of Warcraft. Games and Culture, 1(4), 281–317. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1555412006292613 




Duckworth, A. L., Milkman, K. L., & Laibson, D. (2018). Beyond willpower: Strategies for reducing 
failures of self-control. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 19(3), 102–129. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100618821893 
Duggan, M. (2017). Online harassment 2017. Pew Research Center. 
https://www.pewinternet.org/2017/07/11/online-harassment-2017/ 
Dukas, R. (2004). Causes and consequences of limited attention. Brain, Behavior and Evolution, 
63(4), 197–210. https://doi.org/10.1159/000076781 
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1998). The social brain hypothesis. Evolutionary Anthropology, 6(5), 178–190. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6505(1998)6:5<178::AID-EVAN5>3.0.CO;2-8 
Dunbar, R. I. M. (2016). Do online social media cut through the constraints that limit the size of 
offline social networks? Royal Society Open Science, 3(1), 150292. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.150292 
Dunbar, R. I. M., Arnaboldi, V., Conti, M., & Passarella, A. (2015). The structure of online social 
networks mirrors those in the offline world. Social Networks, 43, 39–47. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2015.04.005 
Dworkin, G. (1988). The theory and practice of autonomy. Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2015.04.005 
Edinger, J. D., Wohlgemuth, W. K., Radtke, R. A., Marsh, G. R., & Quillian, R. E. (2001). Cognitive 
behavioral therapy for treatment of chronic primary insomnia: a randomized controlled trial. 
JAMA, 285(14), 1856–1864. https://doi.org/ 10.1001/jama.285.14.1856 
eMarketer & ExchangeWire. (2018, February 9). Number of YouTube users worldwide from 2016 to 
2021 (in billions) [Graph]. In Statista. Retrieved September 10, 2019, from 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/805656/number-youtube-viewers-worldwide/ 
Epstein, R. (2017). Seven simple steps toward online privacy. Medium. 
https://medium.com/@re_53711/seven-simple-steps-toward-online-privacy-20dcbb9fa82 




Epstein, R., & Robertson, R. E. (2015). The search engine manipulation effect (SEME) and its 
possible impact on the outcomes of elections. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 112(33), E4512–E4521. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1419828112 
European Commission. (2017). ICT for work: Digital skills in the workplace. 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ict-work-digital-skills-workplace 
Eyal, N. (2014). Hooked: How to build habit-forming products. Penguin UK. 
Facebook (2019, July 24). Number of monthly active Facebook users worldwide as of 2nd quarter 
2019 (in millions) [Graph]. In Statista. Retrieved August 12, 2019, from 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-
worldwide/ 
Facebook Newsroom (2019, October 17). Mark Zuckerberg Stands for Voice and Free Expression. 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/10/mark-zuckerberg-stands-for-voice-and-free-
expression/ 
Ferster, C. B., & Skinner, B. F. (1957). Schedules of reinforcement. Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Fisher, M. & Taub, A. (2019, August, 11). How YouTube Radicalized Brazil. The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/world/americas/youtube-brazil.html 
Flaxman, S., Goel, S., & Rao, J. M. (2016). Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and online news 
consumption. Public Opinion Quarterly, 80(S1), 298–320. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfw006 
Floridi, L. (2014). The fourth revolution: How the infosphere is reshaping human reality. Oxford 
University Press. 
Floridi, L. (Ed.). (2015). The onlife manifesto: Being human in a hyperconnected era. Springer. 
Fogg, B. G. (2003). Persuasive technology: Using computers to change what we think and do. 
Morgan Kaufmann. 
Fry, H. (2018). Hello world: How to be human in the age of the machine: WW Norton & Company. 




Fuchs, C., Hofkirchner, W., Schafranek, M., Raffl, C., Sandoval, M., & Bichler, R. (2010). 
Theoretical foundations of the web: Cognition, communication, and co-operation. Towards 
an understanding of Web 1.0, 2.0, 3.0. Future Internet, 2(1), 41–59. 
https://doi.org/10.3390/fi2010041 
Gazzaley, A., & Rosen, L. D. (2016). The distracted mind: Ancient brains in a high-tech world. MIT 
Press. 
General Data Protection Regulation (2018). https://gdpr-info.eu/ 
Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2011). Ideological segregation online and offline. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 126(4), 1799–1839. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr044 
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age. Stanford 
University Press. 
Gigerenzer, G., Gaissmaier, W., Kurz-Milcke, E., Schwartz, L. M., & Woloshin, S. (2007). Helping 
doctors and patients make sense of health statistics. Psychological Science in the Public 
Interest, 8(2), 53–96. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6053.2008.00033.x 
Global Disinformation Index (2019). The quarter billion dollar question: How is disinformation 
gaming ad tech? https://disinformationindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/GDI_Ad-
tech_Report_Screen_AW16.pdf 
Good, I. J. (1967). On the principle of total evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 
17(4), 319–321. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/17.4.319 
Google (2019). Our mission. https://www.google.com/about/. 
Graham, M., De Sabbata, S., & Zook, M. A. (2015). Towards a study of information 
geographies:(im) mutable augmentations and a mapping of the geographies of information. 
Geo: Geography and environment, 2(1), 88–105. https://doi.org/10.1002/geo2.8 




Graves, L. (2017). Anatomy of a fact check: Objective practice and the contested epistemology of 
fact checking. Communication, Culture & Critique, 10(3), 518-537. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/cccr.12163 
Gray, C. M., Kou, Y., Battles, B., Hoggatt, J., & Toombs, A. L. (2018, April 21–26). The dark 
(patterns) side of UX design [Paper presentation]. Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference 
on Human Factors in Computing Systems No. 534, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. 
Green, M. C., & Clark, J. L. (2015). Real or ersatz? Determinants of benefits and costs of online 
social interactions. In S. S. Sundar (Ed.), The handbook of the psychology of communication 
technology, (pp. 247–269). John Wiley & Sons. 
Griffiths, M. D., Kuss, D. J., & Demetrovics, Z. (2014). Social networking addiction: An overview 
of preliminary findings. In K. P. Rosenberg (Ed.), Behavioral addictions (pp. 119–141). 
Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407724-9.00006-9 
Grinberg, N., Joseph, K., Friedland, L., Swire-Thompson, B., & Lazer, D. (2019). Fake news on 
Twitter during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Science, 363(6425), 374–378. 
https://doi.org/ 10.1126/science.aau2706  
Guess, A., Nagler, J., & Tucker, J. (2019). Less than you think: Prevalence and predictors of fake 
news dissemination on Facebook. Science Advances, 5(1), 1-8. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aau4586 
Haase, N., & Betsch, C. (2012). Parents trust other parents: Lay vaccination narratives on the Web 
may create doubt about vaccination safety. Medical Decision Making, 32(4), 645. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0272989X12445286 
Hafenbrädl, S., Waeger, D., Marewski, J. N., & Gigerenzer, G. (2016). Applied decision making 
with fast-and-frugal heuristics. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 5, 
215–231. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2016.04.011 




Harbath, K. & Chakrabarti, S. (2019, January 28). Expanding our efforts to protect elections in 2019. 
Facebook Newsroom. https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/01/elections-2019/ 
Harris, T. (2016, May 18). How technology is hijacking your mind — from a magician and Google 
design ethicist. Medium. https://medium.com/thrive-global/how-technology-hijacks-peoples-
minds-from-a-magician-and-google-s-design-ethicist-56d62ef5edf3 on 05.03.2019 
Hertwig, R. & Engel, C. (Eds.). (in press). Deliberate ignorance: Choosing not to know. MIT Press. 
Hertwig, R. (2017). When to consider boosting: Some rules for policy-makers. Behavioural Public 
Policy, 1(2), 143–161. https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2016.14  
Hertwig, R., & Engel, C. (2016). Homo ignorans: Deliberately choosing not to know. Perspectives 
on Psychological Science, 11(3), 359-372. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691616635594 
Hertwig, R., & Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2017). Nudging and boosting: Steering or empowering good 
decisions. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(6), 973–986. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617702496 
Hertwig, R., & Ryall, M. D. (2019). Nudge versus boost: Agency dynamics under libertarian 
paternalism. The Economic Journal, uez054. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uez054 
Hertwig, R., Pleskac, T. J., Pachur, T., & The Center for Adaptive Rationality (2019), Taming 
uncertainty. MIT Press. 
High-Level Expert Group on AI (2019) Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai 
Holmes, J. (2016, December 1). A Trump Surrogate Drops the Mic: 'There's No Such Thing as 
Facts'. Esquire. https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/videos/a51152/trump-surrogate-no-
such-thing-as-facts/ 
IHS (2016, November 27). Internet of Things (IoT) connected devices installed base worldwide from 
2015 to 2025 (in billions) [Graph]. In Statista. Retrieved August 12, 2019, from 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/471264/iot-number-of-connected-devices-worldwide/ 




Independent High Level Group of Fake News and Online Disinformation. (2018). A multi-
dimensional approach to disinformation. Directorate-General for Communication Networks, 
Content and Technology (European Commission). https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/6ef4df8b-4cea-11e8-be1d-01aa75ed71a1 
Instagram Info Center (2019, July 8). Our Commitment to Lead the Fight Against Online Bullying. 
https://instagram-press.com/blog/2019/07/08/our-commitment-to-lead-the-fight-against-
online-bullying/ 
International Telecommunication Union (2018). Measuring the information society 2018. Executive 
summary. ITU Publications. https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/ind/D-IND-ICTOI-2018-
SUM-PDF-E.pdf 
Jachimowicz, J. M., Duncan, S., Weber, E. U., & Johnson, E. J. (2019). When and why defaults 
influence decisions: A meta-analysis of default effects. Behavioural Public Policy, 3(2), 159-
186. https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2018.43  
Jamieson, K. H. (2018). Cyberwar: How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President What 
We Don't, Can't, and Do Know. Oxford University Press. 
Jaursch, J. (2019). Regulatory reactions to Disinformation. How Germany and The EU are trying to 
tackle opinion manipulation on digital platforms. https://www.stiftung-
nv.de/sites/default/files/regulatory_reactions_to_disinformation_in_germany_and_the_eu.pdf 
Jefferson, T. (1999). Political writings. Edited by Appleby J. and Ball, T. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Johnson, E. J., & Goldstein, D. (2003). Do Defaults Save Lives? Science, 302(5649), 1338-1339. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1091721 
Joinson, A. N. (2001). Self-disclosure in computer-mediated communication: The role of self‐
awareness and visual anonymity. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31(2), 177–192. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.36 




Joinson, A. N. (2007). Disinhibition and the Internet. In Gakenbach, J (ed.) Psychology and the 
Internet (pp. 75-92). Academic Press. 
Kahneman, D. (1973). Attention and effort. Prentice-Hall. 
Kaiser, J. & Rauchfleisch, A. (2018, April, 11). Unite the Right? How YouTube’s Recommendation 
Algorithm Connects The U.S. Far-Right. Medium. 
https://medium.com/@MediaManipulation/unite-the-right-how-youtubes-recommendation-
algorithm-connects-the-u-s-far-right-9f1387ccfabd 
Kelly, S., Truong, M., Shahbaz, A., Earp, M., & White, J. (2017). Freedom on the net 2017: 
Manipulating social media to undermine democracy. Freedom of the Net project. 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2017_Final.pdf 
Kennedy, H., Poell, T., & van Dijck, J. (2015). Data and agency. Big Data & Society, 2(2), 1-7. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951715621569  
Kiesler, S., Siegel, J., & McGuire, T. W. (1984). Social psychological aspects of computer-mediated 
communication. American Psychologist, 39(10), 1123-1134. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-
066X.39.10.1123 
King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. E. (2017). How the Chinese government fabricates social media 
posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument. American Political Science Review, 
111(3), 484-501. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000144 
Kokolakis, S. (2017). Privacy attitudes and privacy behaviour: A review of current research on the 
privacy paradox phenomenon. Computers & security, 64, 122-134. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2015.07.002 
Kosinski, M., Stillwell, D., & Graepel, T. (2013). Private traits and attributes are predictable from 
digital records of human behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
110(15), 5802-5805. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1218772110 




Kowalski, R. M., Giumetti, G. W., Schroeder, A. N., & Lattanner, M. R. (2014). Bullying in the 
digital age: A critical review and meta-analysis of cyberbullying research among youth. 
Psychological Bulletin, 140(4), 1073-1137. doi:10.1037/a0035618 
Kozyreva, A. & Hertwig, R. (2019). The interpretation of uncertainty in ecological rationality. 
Synthese, 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02140-w 
Lapidot-Lefler, N., & Barak, A. (2012). Effects of anonymity, invisibility, and lack of eye-contact on 
toxic online disinhibition. Computers in human behavior, 28(2), 434-443. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2011.10.014 
Lazer, D. M., Baum, M. A., Benkler, Y., Berinsky, A. J., Greenhill, K. M., Menczer, F., . . . 
Rothschild, D. (2018). The science of fake news. Science, 359(6380), 1094-1096. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aao2998 
Leiser, M (2019). Regulating Computational Propaganda: Lessons from International Law. 
Cambridge International Law Journal, forthcoming. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3440157  
Lerman, K., Yan, X., & Wu, X. Z. (2016). The" majority illusion" in social networks. PLoS ONE 
11(2): e0147617. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147617 
Leviston, Z., Walker, I., & Morwinski, S. (2013). Your opinion on climate change might not be as 
common as you think. Nature Climate Change, 3(4), 334-337. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1743 
Lewandowsky, S. & Lynam, J. (2018, December 29). Combating ‘fake news’: The 21st century civic 
duty. The Irish Times. https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/combating-fake-news-the-21st-
century-civic-duty-1.3739327 
Lewandowsky, S. (in press-a). The ‘Post-Truth’ World, Misinformation, and Information Literacy: A 
Perspective from Cognitive Science. In S. Goldstein (Ed.) Informed societies—why 
information literacy matters for citizenship, participation and democracy. Facet.  




Lewandowsky, S. (in press-b). Willful construction of ignorance: A tale of two ontologies. In R. 
Hertwig & C. Engel (Eds.), Deliberate ignorance: Choosing not to know. MIT Press.  
Lewandowsky, S., Cook, J., & Ecker, U. K. (2017). Letting the gorilla emerge from the mist: Getting 
past post-truth. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 6(4), 418-424. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.11.002 
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K., & Cook, J. (2017). Beyond misinformation: Understanding and 
coping with the “post-truth” era. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 
6(4), 353-369. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.07.008 
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K., Seifert, C. M., Schwarz, N., & Cook, J. (2012). Misinformation and 
its correction: Continued influence and successful debiasing. Psychological Science in the 
Public Interest, 13(3), 106-131. https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100612451018 
Lewandowsky, S., Jetter, M., & Ecker, U. (2019). Donald Trump and strategic diversion in the age 
of Twitter [Manuscript submitted for publication]. School of Psychological Science, 
University of Bristol. 
Lichterman, J. (2017, March 1). This site is “taking the edge off rant mode” by making readers pass 
a quiz before commenting. NiemanLab, https://www.niemanlab.org/2017/03/this-site-is-
taking-the-edge-off-rant-mode-by-making-readers-pass-a-quiz-before-commenting 
Lorenz-Spreen, P. Lewandowsky, S., Sunstein, C. & Hertwig, R. (2019). How the behavioural 
sciences can empower truth and dialogue in the online ecosystem [Manuscript submitted for 
publication]. Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, 
Berlin. 
Lorenz-Spreen, P., Mønsted, B. M., Hövel, P., & Lehmann, S. (2019) Accelerating Dynamics of 
Collective Attention. Nature Communications. 10, 1759, 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-
019-09311-w 




Luan, S., Schooler, L. J., & Gigerenzer, G. (2011). A signal-detection analysis of fast-and-frugal 
trees. Psychological Review, 118(2), 316-338. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022684 
Luca, M., Malhotra, D., & Poliquin, C. (2017). Handgun waiting periods reduce gun deaths. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(46), 12162-12165. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1619896114 
Marsh, E. J., & Rajaram, S. (2019). The digital expansion of the mind: Implications of internet usage 
for memory and cognition. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 8(1), 1-
14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2018.11.001 
Martignon, L., Katsikopoulos, K. V., & Woike, J. K. (2008). Categorization with limited resources: 
A family of simple heuristics. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 52(6), 352-361. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2008.04.003 
Mathur, A., Acar, G., Friedman, M., Lucherini, E., Mayer, J., Chetty, M., & Narayanan, A. (2019). 
Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites. Proceedings of the 
ACM on Human-Computer Interaction. ArXiv. https://doi.org/10.1145/3359183 
Matthias, A. (2004). The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning 
automata. Ethics and information technology, 6(3), 175-183. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-
004-3422-1 
Matz, S. C., Kosinski, M., Nave, G., & Stillwell, D. J. (2017). Psychological targeting as an effective 
approach to digital mass persuasion. Proceedings of the national academy of sciences, 
114(48), 12714-12719. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1710966114 
Mazarr, M. J., Bauer, R. M., Casey, A., Heintz, S., & Matthews, L. J. (2019). The Emerging Risk of 
Virtual Societal Warfare. RAND Corporation. 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2700/RR2714/RAND_RR2
714.pdf 




McCright, A. M., & Dunlap, R. E. (2017). Combatting misinformation requires recognizing its types 
and the factors that facilitate its spread and resonance. Journal of Applied Research in 
Memory and Cognition, 6(4), 389-396. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.09.005 
McDowell M., Rebitschek F. G., Gigerenzer G., & Wegwarth O. (2016). A Simple Tool for 
Communicating the Benefits and Harms of Health Interventions: A Guide for Creating a Fact 
Box. MDM Policy & Practice 1, 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1177/2381468316665365 
McFarland, L. A., & Ployhart, R. E. (2015). Social media: A contextual framework to guide research 
and practice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 100(6), 1653-1677. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039244 
McGrew, S., Breakstone, J., Ortega, T., Smith, M., & Wineburg, S. (2018). Can students evaluate 
online sources? Learning from assessments of civic online reasoning. Theory and Research in 
Social Education, 46(2), 165-193. https://doi.org/10.1080/00933104.2017.1416320 
McGrew, S., Smith, M., Breakstone, J., Ortega, T., & Wineburg, S. (2019). Improving university 
students’ web savvy: An intervention study. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 89, 
485-500.  https://doi.org/10.1111/bjep.12279 
McGuire, W. J., & Papageorgis, D. (1961). The relative efficacy of various types of prior belief-
defense in producing immunity against persuasion. The Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 62(2), 327-337. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0042026 
Meshi, D., Tamir, D. I., & Heekeren, H. R. (2015). The emerging neuroscience of social media. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(12), 771-782. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.09.004 
Metzger, M. J., & Flanagin, A. J. (2015). Psychological approaches to credibility assessment online. 
In: Sundar, S. (Ed.) The Handbook of the Psychology of Communication Technology, John 
Wiley & Sons, pp. 445-466. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118426456.ch20 
Misoch, S. (2015). Stranger on the internet: Online self-disclosure and the role of visual anonymity. 
Computers in Human Behavior, 48, 535-541. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2015.02.027 




Mitchell, A., Gottfried, J., Stocking, G., Walker, M., & Fedeli, S. (2019). Many Americans say 
made-up news is a critical problem that needs to be fixed. Pew Research Center Journalism & 
Media. https://www.journalism.org/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-a-
critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fixed/ 
Mittelstadt, B. D., Allo, P., Taddeo, M., Wachter, S., & Floridi, L. (2016). The ethics of algorithms: 
Mapping the debate. Big Data & Society, 3(2),1-21. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951716679679 
Motta, M., Callaghan, T., & Sylvester, S. (2018). Knowing less but presuming more: Dunning-
Kruger effects and the endorsement of anti-vaccine policy attitudes. Social Science & 
Medicine, 211, 274-281. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.06.032 
Mozur, P. (2018, October 15). A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From Myanmar’s 
Military. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-
facebook-genocide.html 
NATO StratCom (2017). Digital hydra: security implications of false information online. 
https://www.stratcomcoe.org/digital-hydra-security-implications-false-information-online 
Newell, S., & Marabelli, M. (2015). Strategic opportunities (and challenges) of algorithmic decision-
making: A call for action on the long-term societal effects of ‘datification’. The Journal of 
Strategic Information Systems, 24(1), 3-14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsis.2015.02.001 
Newport, C. (2016). Deep work: Rules for focused success in a distracted world. Hachette Book 
Group. 
Nguyen, M., Bin, Y. S., & Campbell, A. (2012). Comparing online and offline self-disclosure: A 
systematic review. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 15(2), 103-111. 
https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2011.0277 
Norwegian Consumer Council (2018). Deceived by design. https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/2018-06-27-deceived-by-design-final.pdf 




Obermeyer, Z., Powers, B., Vogeli, C., & Mullainathan, S. (2019). Dissecting racial bias in an 
algorithm used to manage the health of populations. Science, 366(6464), 447-453. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aax2342 
Ortiz-Ospina, E. (2019, September 18). The rise of social media. Our World in Data. 
https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media 
Oxman, A. D., & Paulsen, E. J. (2019). Who can you trust? A review of free online sources of 
“trustworthy” information about treatment effects for patients and the public. BMC medical 
informatics and decision making, 19(1), 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12911-019-0772-5 
Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: What the Internet is hiding from you: Penguin UK. 
Pasquale, F. (2015). The black box society. Harvard University Press. 
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019). Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019). Fighting 
misinformation on social media using crowdsourced judgments of news source quality. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(7), 2521-2526. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1806781116 
Persily, N. (2017). The 2016 US Election: Can democracy survive the internet? Journal of 
democracy, 28(2), 63-76.  https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0025. 
Phillips, N. D., Neth, H., Woike, J. K., & Gaissmaier, W. (2017). FFTrees: A toolbox to create, 
visualize, and evaluate fast-and-frugal decision trees. Judgment and Decision Making, 12(4), 
344–368. 
Pilkington, E. (2018, August 19). 'Truth isn't truth': Giuliani trumps 'alternative facts' with new 
Orwellian outburst. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/19/truth-
isnt-truth-rudy-giuliani-trump-alternative-facts-orwellian 
Plato (ca. 370 B.C.E./1997). Phaedrus. In J. M. Cooper & D. S. Hutchinson (Eds.). Plato: Complete 
works. Hackett Publishing. 




Proctor, R. N., & Schiebinger, L. (2008). Agnotology: The making and unmaking of ignorance. 
Stanford University Press. 
Rahwan, I., Cebrian, M., Obradovich, N., Bongard, J., Bonnefon, J. F., Breazeal, C., ... & Jennings, 
N. R. (2019). Machine behaviour. Nature, 568(7753), 477-486. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1138-y 
Rauchfleisch, A. & Kaiser, J. (2017, September 22). YouTubes Algorithmen sorgen dafür, dass AfD-
Fans unter sich bleiben. Vice. https://www.vice.com/de/article/59d98n/youtubes-
algorithmen-sorgen-dafur-dass-afd-fans-unter-sich-bleiben 
Rebonato, R. (2012). Taking liberties: A critical examination of libertarian paternalism. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Reijula, S., & Hertwig, R. (2019). Self-nudging and the citizen choice architect. [Manuscript 
submitted for publication]. Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human 
Development, Berlin. 
Reynolds, E. (2019, August 11). Has Tinder lost its spark? The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/aug/11/dating-apps-has-tinder-lost-its-spark 
Rheault, L., Rayment, E., & Musulan, A. (2019). Politicians in the line of fire: Incivility and the 
treatment of women on social media. Research & Politics, 6(1), 1-7. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018816228 
Roberts, M. E. (2018). Censored: distraction and diversion inside China's Great Firewall. Princeton 
University Press. 
Rogers, T., Milkman, K. L., & Volpp, K. G. (2014). Commitment devices: using initiatives to 
change behavior. JaMa Network, 311(20), 2065-2066. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2014.3485 




Rojecki, A., & Meraz, S. (2016). Rumors and factitious informational blends: The role of the web in 
speculative politics. New Media & Society, 18(1), 25-43. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814535724 
Roozenbeek, J., & van der Linden, S. (2018). The fake news game: actively inoculating against the 
risk of misinformation. Journal of Risk Research, 22(5), 570-580. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2018.1443491 
Roozenbeek, J., & van der Linden, S. (2019). Fake news game confers psychological resistance 
against online misinformation. Palgrave Communications, 5:65, 1-10. doi:10.1057/s41599-
019-0279-9 
Rosen, C. (2008). The myth of multitasking. The New Atlantis, 20, 105–110.  
Rosen, G., Harbath, K, & Gleicher, N. (2019, October 21). Helping to protect the 2020 US elections. 
Facebook Newsroom. https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/10/update-on-election-integrity-
efforts/ 
Rosen, L. D., Carrier, L. M., & Cheever, N. A. (2013). Facebook and texting made me do it: Media-
induced task-switching while studying. Computers in Human Behavior, 29(3), 948–958. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2012.12.001 
Rose-Stockwell, T. (2018, April 18). How to design better social media: On designing social tools 
for society. Medium. https://medium.com/s/story/how-to-fix-what-social-media-has-broken-
cb0b2737128 
Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social 
perception and attribution processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13(3), 279–
301. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(77)90049-X 
Schelling, T. C. (1978). Egonomics, or the art of self-management. The American Economic Review, 
68(2), 290–294. 




Schwartz, B. (2016, November 14). Google’s search knows about over 130 trillion pages. Search 
Engine Land. https://searchengineland.com/googles-search-indexes-hits-130-trillion-pages-
documents-263378 
Simon, H. A. (1971). Designing organizations for an information-rich world. In M. Greenberger 
(Ed.), Computers, communications, and the public interest (pp. 37–72). The John Hopkins 
Press. 
Simon, H. A. (1990). Invariants of human behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, 41, 1–20.  
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.41.020190.000245 
Smith, A. (2018a, September 5). Many Facebook users don’t understand how the site’s news feed 
works. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/05/many-
facebook-users-dont-understand-how-the-sites-news-feed-works/ 
Smith, A. (2018b, November 16). Public attitudes toward computer algorithms. Pew Research 
Center. http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/11/16/public-attitudes-toward-computer-
algorithms/ 
Soroka, S., Fournier, P., & Nir, L. (2019). Cross-national evidence of a negativity bias in 
psychophysiological reactions to news. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 116(38), 18888–18892. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1908369116 
Sparrow, B., Liu, J., & Wegner, D. M. (2011). Google effects on memory: Cognitive consequences 
of having information at our fingertips. Science, 333(6043), 776–778. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1207745 
Specter, M. (2009). Denialism: How irrational thinking hinders scientific progress, harms the 
planet, and threatens our lives. Penguin.  
Spitzer, M. (2012). Digitale Demenz [Digital dementia]. Nervenheilkunde, 31(7–8), 493–497. 




Stothart, C., Mitchum, A., & Yehnert, C. (2015). The attentional cost of receiving a cell phone 
notification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 
41(4), 893–897. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000100 
Suler, J. (2004). The online disinhibition effect. Cyberpsychology & Behavior, 7(3), 321–326. 
https://doi.org/10.1089/1094931041291295 
Sunstein, C. R. (2015). The ethics of nudging. Yale Journal on Regulation, 32(2), 413–450. 
Sunstein, C. R. (2016a). People prefer system 2 nudges (kind of). Duke Law Journal, 66(121), 121–
168. 
Sunstein, C. R. (2016b). The ethics of influence: Government in the age of behavioral science. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sunstein, C. R. (2017). # Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social media: Princeton 
University Press. 
Susser, D., Roessler, B., & Nissenbaum, H. (2018). Online manipulation: Hidden influences in a 
digital world. SSRN. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3306006 
Sweeney, L. (2013). Discrimination in online ad delivery. Queue. 11(3). 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2460276.2460278 
Telegram Blog (2019). Silent Messages, Slow Mode, Admin Titles and More. 
https://telegram.org/blog/silent-messages-slow-mode 
 Tencent (2019, May 15). Number of monthly active WeChat users from 1st quarter 2012 to 1st 
quarter 2019 (in millions) [Graph]. In Statista. Retrieved August 12, 2019, from 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/255778/number-of-active-wechat-messenger-accounts/ 
Thaler, R. H. (2018). Nudge, not sludge. Science, 361(6401), 431. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aau9241 




Thaler, R. H., & Benartzi, S. (2004). Save more tomorrow™: Using behavioral economics to 
increase employee saving. Journal of Political Economy, 112(S1), S164-S187. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/380085 
Thaler, R., H, & Sunstein, C., R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and 
happiness. Yale University Press. 
Thorens, G., Wullschleger, A., Khan, R., Achab, S., & Zullino, D. F. (2012). What is addictive in 
Internet? The Open Addiction Journal, 5(Suppl 1), 14–19.  
Tidwell, L. C., & Walther, J. B. (2002). Computer‐ mediated communication effects on disclosure, 
impressions, and interpersonal evaluations: Getting to know one another a bit at a time. 
Human Communication Research, 28(3), 317–348. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
2958.2002.tb00811.x 
Tufekci, Z. (2015). Algorithmic harms beyond Facebook and Google: Emergent challenges of 
computational agency. Colorado Technology Law Journal, 13, 203–218. 
Tufekci, Z. (2018). YouTube, the great radicalizer. New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.html 
Turilli, M., & Floridi, L. (2009). The ethics of information transparency. Ethics and Information 
Technology, 11(2), 105–112. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-009-9187-9   
Twitter & Wikipedia (2019, June 21, 2019). Most popular tweets on Twitter as of June 2019, by 
number of retweets (in millions) [Graph]. In Statista. Retrieved September 19, 2019, from 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/699462/twitter-most-retweeted-posts-all-time 
Uberti, D. (2016, December 15). The real history of fake news. Columbia Journalism Review. 
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/fake_news_history.php 
Uncapher, M. R., & Wagner, A. D. (2018). Minds and brains of media multitaskers: Current findings 
and future directions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(40), 9889–9896. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1611612115  




Van der Linden, S., Leiserowitz, A., Rosenthal, S., & Maibach, E. (2017). Inoculating the public 
against misinformation about climate change. Global Challenges, 1(2), Article 1600008. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/gch2.201600008 
Van der Linden, S., Maibach, E., Cook, J., Leiserowitz, A., & Lewandowsky, S. (2017). Inoculating 
against misinformation. Science, 358(6367), 1141–1142. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aar4533 
Vargo, C. J., Guo, L., & Amazeen, M. A. (2018). The agenda-setting power of fake news: A big data 
analysis of the online media landscape from 2014 to 2016. New Media & Society, 20(5), 
2028–2049. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444817712086 
Voosen, P. (2017). The AI detectives. Science 357(6346), 22–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.357.6346.22 
Vosoughi, S., Mohsenvand, M. N., & Roy, D. (2017). Rumor gauge: Predicting the veracity of 
rumors on Twitter. ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data, 11(4), 1–36. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3070644 
Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. Science, 
359(6380), 1146–1151. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559 
Walther, J. B., Loh, T., & Granka, L. (2005). Let me count the ways: The interchange of verbal and 
nonverbal cues in computer-mediated and face-to-face affinity. Journal of Language and 
Social Psychology, 24(1), 36–65. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X04273036 
Walther, J. B., Van Der Heide, B., Ramirez, A., Burgoon, J. K., & Peña, J. (2015). Interpersonal and 
hyperpersonal dimensions of computer-mediated communication. In S. Sundar (Ed.), The 
handbook of the psychology of communication technology (pp. 3–22), John Wiley & Sons. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118426456.ch1  
Waltzman, R. (2017, April 27). The weaponization of information: The need for cognitive security. 
Testimony presented before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on 






Ward, A. F., Duke, K., Gneezy, A., & Bos, M. W. (2017). Brain drain: The mere presence of one’s 
own smartphone reduces available cognitive capacity. Journal of the Association for 
Consumer Research, 2(2), 140–154. https://doi.org/10.1086/691462 
Wardle, C., & Derakhshan, H. (2017). Information disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework 
for research and policymaking. Council of Europe. https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-
report-version-august-2018/16808c9c77 
Watts, D. J., & Rothschild, D. (2017). Rebuilding legitimacy in a post-truth age. Medium. 
https://medium.com/@duncanjwatts/rebuilding-legitimacy-in-a-post-truth-age-2f9af19855a5 
We Are Social, DataReportal, & Hootsuite. (2019, July 18). Global digital population as of July 
2019 (in millions) [Graph]. In Statista. Retrieved August 12, 2019, from  
https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide 
Weiser, M. (1991). The computer for the 21st century. Scientific American, 265(3), 94–105. 
WhatsApp Blog (2018). More changes to forwarding. https://blog.whatsapp.com/10000647/More-
changes-to-forwarding 
Wike, R., Silver, L., & Castillo, A. (2019, April 29). Many across the globe are dissatisfied with how 
democracy is working. Pew Research Center. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/04/29/many-across-the-globe-are-dissatisfied-
with-how-democracy-is-working/ 
Wikipedia (2019). Ten simple rules for editing Wikipedia. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Ten_simple_rules_for_editing_Wikipedia 
Wiley, J., Goldman, S. R., Graesser, A. C., Sanchez, C. A., Ash, I. K., & Hemmerich, J. A. (2009). 
Source evaluation, comprehension, and learning in Internet science inquiry tasks. American 




Educational Research Journal, 46(4), 1060–1106. 
https://doi.org/10.3102/0002831209333183 
Wineburg, S., & McGrew, S. (2019). Lateral reading and the nature of expertise: Reading less and 
learning more when evaluating digital information. Teachers College Record 121(11). 
Wineburg, S., McGrew, S., Breakstone, J., & Ortega, T. (2016). Evaluating information: The 
cornerstone of civic online reasoning. Stanford Digital Repository. 
http://purl.stanford.edu/fv751yt5934 
Wiradhany, W., & Nieuwenstein, M. R. (2017). Cognitive control in media multitaskers: Two 
replication studies and a meta-analysis. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 79(8), 2620–
2641. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-017-1408-4 
Wong, J. C. & Levin, S. (2019, January 25). YouTube vows to recommend fewer conspiracy theory 
videos. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/25/youtube-
conspiracy-theory-videos-recommendations 
Wood, W. (2019). Good Habits, Bad Habits: The Science of Making Positive Changes That Stick. 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Woolley, S. C., & Howard, P. N. (2017). Computational propaganda worldwide: Executive 
summary. Working paper 2017.11. Project on Computational Propaganda. 
http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Casestudies-
ExecutiveSummary.pdf 
Yaffa, J. (2014, July 14). Dmitry Kiselev Is Redefining the Art of Russian Propaganda. New 
Republic. https://newrepublic.com/article/118438/dmitry-kiselev-putins-favorite-tv-host-
russias-top-propogandist 
Young, I. M. (2002). Inclusion and democracy. Oxford University Press. 




Yousif, S. R., Aboody, R., & Keil, F. C. (2019). The illusion of consensus: A failure to distinguish 
between true and false consensus. Psychological Science, 30(8), 1195–1204. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619856844 
Zarsky, T. (2016). The trouble with algorithmic decisions: An analytic road map to examine 
efficiency and fairness in automated and opaque decision making. Science, Technology, & 
Human Values, 41(1), 118–132. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243915605575 
Zuboff, S. (2019). The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for the future at the new frontier of 
power. Profile Books. 
 
Graphic material: Images used in figures are licensed at Adobe Stock, except for a “nudging” icon 
in Figure 7, which is a courtesy of Luis Prado at thenounproject.com (CC license); icons in 
Figure 2, which are used with permission of the Dark Patterns Project at Princeton 
University, and images in Figure 11, which are screenshots of the Bad News Game at 
getbadnews.com. 
